Why It Matters
Static Linkage
Geopolitics of Lunar Exploration
The Moon is increasingly viewed as a strategic asset in global geopolitics.
- The U.S. and China are competing for dominance in lunar exploration.
- International collaborations like the Artemis Accords and ILRS reflect this competition.
- India's role is pivotal as it navigates partnerships with both superpowers.
- Future lunar missions will require interoperability among different nations' technologies.
Core Explanation
“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there,” the English novelist L.P. Hartley wrote famously in his 1953 novel The Go-Between. In a peculiar twist, the same cannot be said of the Moon. It is not a foreign country, or even a foreign world: the U.S.’s manoeuvring to beat China to the satellite has increasingly meant the Moon is an extension of the Earth’s geopolitics and political culture.
At the ninth India-U.S. Civil Space Joint Working Group meeting at Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) headquarters last week, NASA invited the organisation to participate in its ‘Moon Base’ programme, ostensibly as part of the two countries’ Artemis Accords partnership. According to NASA, the facility will be built piece by piece near the Moon’s south pole, where sunlight is available for longer durations and where permanently shadowed craters hold significant water-ice deposits. The target is for it to be humankind’s first outpost on a new celestial body, taking shape around 2030.
NASA is leaning heavily on private industry for this, having already awarded contracts to Astrolab (worth $219 million) and Lunar Outpost ($220 million) for lunar terrain vehicles, Blue Origin ($188 million) for delivery task orders, and Astrobotic, Firefly Aerospace, and Intuitive Machines ($600 million) for four robotic missions to the Moon to deliver equipment. Intuitive is also developing a relay satellite under a separate contract.
Further, as part of NASA chief Jared Isaacman’s overhaul of the Artemis programme earlier this year, in no small part responding to the Trump administration’s December 2025 space policy calling for securing U.S. interests in cislunar space, the profiles of the Artemis III and IV Missions changed. Now, Mission III will be a crewed test flight in Earth orbit in 2027 and Mission IV will attempt the first lunar landing under the programme in 2028. Taken together, the ‘Moon Base’ is effectively the next phase of the new Artemis programme, tasked with keeping — intermittently at first, and eventually continuously — Artemis astronauts on the Moon.
Since India signed the Artemis Accords in 2023, NASA and ISRO have engaged regularly across several areas. NASA has trained India’s astronaut candidates for the ‘Gaganyaan’ human spaceflight mission. In 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump jointly announced a broader strategic technologies framework, including spaceflight.
ISRO also launched the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar, a major scientific mission that has been a decade in the making. NASA instruments are slated to fly on forthcoming Chandrayaan missions just as they did on the first three.
While it seems almost facile to suggest the U.S. also engage with China considering the latter’s formidable spaceflight capabilities — many industry experts agree the age of U.S. dominance in spaceflight is in its twilight years — the two countries’ actions mean that the lines they have drawn on the Earth are set to be extended to the Moon, and that will pose new challenges for India.
In 2021, China and Russia announced plans to cooperate on an ‘International Lunar Research Station’ (ILRS), which China described as a long-term lunar science and technology facility, also to be built near the south pole and with a targeted deadline of 2035. Like the Artemis Accords, the ILRS is an international effort, currently involving 17 countries and organisations and more than 50 research institutions worldwide.
Earlier this year, when NASA solicited proposals for payloads to send to the Moon, it said it welcomed foreign entities “except those with bilateral ties to China”. NASA’s FY2027 budget request has also described the ‘Moon Base’ as a means to establish U.S. “superiority on the Moon” and to preserve U.S. leadership in space — language with more strategic overtones relative to the agency’s pre-Trump rhetoric.
Given how much of U.S. policy is shaped by out-competing China, India’s gains or losses will not be restricted to its space programme either. For instance, ISRO’s engagement with NASA has arguably become more politicised thanks to NASA’s own politicisation by virtue of having to respond to China’s ILRS plans. Contrary to the focus areas of these bodies through much of their histories, future discussions would be poorly served by treating their engagement on the Moon as purely exploratory.
For example, the Artemis Accords do not say a signatory cannot cooperate with non-signatory countries. (In June, ISRO also hosted the BRICS Heads of Space Agencies meeting in Bengaluru with China among the participants). However, the Artemis programme itself is increasingly concerned with infrastructure, and building one’s components, equipment, tools, etc. to be interoperable with that infrastructure will thus extend geopolitical alignments on the Earth to the Moon.
Suppose China invites India to join the ILRS in 2035. (In fact, the Moon could become one of the few domains in which India and China may have a practical incentive to cooperate on the Moon even while competing on the Earth, and India should endeavour to preserve rather than foreclose that possibility.) The government can say ‘yes’, but if China uses different communication protocols, data formats or operational procedures, India will face a tough choice: to build a second, expensive set of capabilities with China or to persuade China to change its systems to be interoperable with American designs.
That is, the U.S.-China competition means India’s increasing embedding in one technological ecosystem will also increase the cost of engaging with the other in future. At the same time, India will be mistaken to avoid deepening ISRO’s relationship with NASA. The U.S.-led ecosystem is much larger and more technologically diverse than the one led by China. But India may nonetheless have to reconsider its strategic autonomy in the spaceflight domain — particularly if the U.S.-China rivalry changes substantially over the next two or three decades. It should certainly steer clear of any dependencies that could hold back its own space programme because of U.S. objections.
In fact, one useful way to achieve this that also presents yet another opportunity for Indian leadership in space is to push for open international standards that allow nations to retain sovereign control over specific hardware and software components without hampering collaborations in space. Such diplomacy could foster interoperability between the lunar blocs and allow India to retain its strategic autonomy.
If it does not, the Moon may cease to be a foreign world but India may find itself a foreigner there.
The Hindu Profiles / India in Space / space programme
Prelims
Key Facts
- NASA's Moon Base targets completion around 2030.
- India signed the Artemis Accords in 2023.
- China and Russia plan an International Lunar Research Station by 2035.
- NASA awarded contracts worth over $1 billion for lunar missions.
- ISRO launched the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar mission.
Prelims Trap
Mains
GS-III: Science and Technology- developments and their applications and effects in everyday life.
Mains Practice Question
Discuss the strategic implications of India's participation in NASA's Moon Base programme. (GS-III, 15 marks)
Mains Angle
Significance : The Moon Base programme offers India a platform to enhance its space capabilities and strengthen ties with the U.S. This collaboration could lead to advancements in technology and scientific research, positioning India as a key player in international space exploration. Challenges: India faces the challenge of balancing its relationships with both the U.S. and China. The potential for technological dependency on one superpower could limit India's strategic autonomy in space. Additionally, the need for interoperability between different lunar missions poses a significant hurdle. Way Forward: India should advocate for open international standards in space technology to maintain its strategic autonomy. Engaging in diplomatic efforts to foster collaboration while retaining control over its technological assets will be crucial. Strengthening ISRO's capabilities through partnerships while exploring independent avenues for lunar exploration can ensure India's competitive edge. Conclusion: As the Moon becomes a new frontier for geopolitical competition, India's strategic decisions in space exploration will have long-lasting implications. By navigating these complexities wisely, India can secure its interests and contribute meaningfully to global space initiatives.
PYQ Linkage
Consider the following space missions: I. Axiom-4 II. SpaDeX III. Gaganyaan How many of the space missions given above encourage and support microgravity research?
This question relates to space missions, which is directly connected to India's involvement in international lunar exploration initiatives.
Which of the following statements about Rare Earth Elements (REEs) and Critical Minerals is/are correct ? 1. Modern technological innovations including Artificial Intelligence, robotics and space exploration extensively utilise Rare Earth Elements (REEs). 2. China has the highest share in mining of REEs followed by India. 3. The Government of India launched the National Critical Mineral Mission (
This question discusses modern technological innovations in space exploration, relevant to India's participation in the Moon Base programme.
With reference to 'Astrosat', the astronomical observatory launched by India, which of the following statements is/are correct? 1. Other than USA and Russia, India is the only country to have launched a similar observatory into space. 2. Astrosat is a 2000 kg satellite placed in an orbit at 1650 km above the surface of the Earth. Select the correct answer using the code given below.
Astrosat's mention highlights India's advancements in space technology, relevant to its growing role in international space exploration.
Which of the following statements with regard to India's Deep Ocean Mission is/are correct? 1. It was launched by the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India. 2. Matsya-6000 has been designed to carry 3 people for deep sea exploration. 3. Samudrayaan is a project under this mission. Select the answer using the code given below:
India's Deep Ocean Mission reflects its commitment to scientific exploration, paralleling its ambitions in lunar exploration.