Why this matters for UPSC
Ethics in Governance is the Fourth Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, submitted in January 2007. It is the standard reference for almost every GS IV question on corruption, probity, the code of ethics and whistleblowers. It also feeds GS II (Lokpal, election reform, civil services, judiciary) and the Essay paper.
What is this report about?
First, the basics: who wrote this report, when, and what problem it was asked to solve.
Jan 2007
Report submitted
9
Chapters
48
Recommendation groups
Corruption touches ordinary life in India: a bribe for a ration card, a "fee" for a building plan, a rigged tender for a road. Earlier anti-corruption drives had left people cynical. Many saw them as posturing, or as tools to harass political opponents.
In August 2005 the Government of India set up the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2nd ARC) to prepare a blueprint for revamping public administration. Its chairman was M. Veerappa Moily. "Ethics in governance" was one of its thirteen terms of reference.
This Fourth Report deals with that subject. Before writing it, the Commission held a National Colloquium at the National Judicial Academy, Bhopal, in September 2006, and consulted Lokayuktas, vigilance officers and former Chief Justices.
The report marks with a star (*) the recommendations that the government could carry out at once through executive orders, without a new law.
In one sentence: the report says values matter, but values survive only when laws, institutions and well-designed systems back them up.
The report in time
1966
First ARC set up; it first proposed a Lokpal-type ombudsman
31 Aug 2005
Government resolution constitutes the Second ARC under M. Veerappa Moily
Sep 2006
National Colloquium on ethics in governance at the National Judicial Academy, Bhopal
Jan 2007
Fourth Report, Ethics in Governance, submitted
2013
Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act passed, partly reflecting the report’s ombudsman ideas
2014
Whistle Blowers Protection Act passed, but not yet brought into force
Quick check
Who chaired the Second ARC, and which number report is Ethics in Governance?
The big picture
Six ideas carry the whole report. Learn these first and every detail later has a place to sit.
The report starts from a plain observation: India does not lack rules. What it lacks is enforcement, and a culture of integrity behind the rules.
- Ethics need codes. Ministers, legislators, civil servants, regulators and judges should each have a written code of ethics, plus a body that enforces it.
- Corruption law needs sharper teeth. The Prevention of Corruption Act should cover more acts, punish collusion harder, and stop sanction delays from blocking trials.
- Watchdogs need independence. A constitutional national ombudsman (the Rashtriya Lokayukta), strong State Lokayuktas and local ombudsmen.
- Honest officers need protection. Whistleblowers and honest decision-makers must be shielded from harassment.
- Citizens are part of the solution. Citizens’ charters, social audit, the media and a citizen-suit law can all expose wrongdoing.
- Systems beat sermons. Competition, simpler procedures, e-governance and less discretion shrink the space for bribes.
Mental map: how the report is built
Problem
Corruption has become a habit, and earlier drives lost public trust
Ethical framework
Codes for ministers, legislators, civil servants, regulators and judges
Legal framework
Stronger anti-corruption law, whistleblowers, benami property, serious frauds
Institutions
Rashtriya Lokayukta, Lokayuktas, vigilance commissions, local ombudsmen
Society and systems
Citizens, media, social audit, e-governance, less discretion
Quick check
According to the report, is India’s corruption problem caused by a lack of rules?
Why corruption persists in India
The report’s diagnosis: why public office in India became so easy to misuse.
≈ 90%
People in the unorganised sector (report’s figure)
≈ 6 years
To clear State corruption-trial backlog (2005 data)
The report names three reasons that corruption grew in India. First, a colonial habit of unchallenged authority. Second, a huge gap in power between a secure government employee and a citizen who lives on daily wages.
Third, the early decades of heavy controls, licences and scarcity put the citizen at the mercy of the official. Subsidies and beneficiary schemes made the official a patron and the citizen a supplicant.
It also blames over-centralisation. The further power sits from the people, the weaker the link between authority and accountability.
The report quotes economist Robert Klitgaard’s formula: monopoly plus discretion minus accountability equals corruption. This is the Klitgaard formula, and the whole report can be read as an attack on each of its three parts.
Klitgaard formula: where corruption comes from
Monopoly
Only one office can give you the service
+ Discretion
The official can say yes, no or later
− Accountability
Nobody checks the decision
= Corruption
A bribe becomes the price of a yes
The report separates two kinds of bribery. In coercive corruption, the citizen is a victim who pays to get what is already theirs. In collusive corruption, giver and taker both gain, and society loses, as with rigged contracts or adulterated food.
As controls are lifted, extortion declines but collusion tends to grow. The report wants the law to hit collusion hardest.
Its evidence on enforcement is grim. At the start of 2005, State anti-corruption bodies had 12,285 cases pending trial and disposed of only 2,005 that year. The CBI’s conviction rate was low, though about double that of State agencies.
Quick check
What is the difference between coercive and collusive corruption?
Codes of ethics versus codes of conduct
The single most-tested idea in this report: why India needs both kinds of code.
A code of conduct is a list of specific dos and don’ts: declare your assets, do not accept gifts above a limit. A code of ethics states broad values: act in the public interest, be impartial, be honest. One tells you what is forbidden; the other tells you how to think.
The report says India had several conduct rules but no code of ethics for ministers or civil servants. Conduct rules alone cannot cover every situation, especially at senior levels where discretion is wide.
For values, it points to the UK’s Nolan Committee, whose seven Nolan principles of public life are often quoted in answers.
| Principle | What it means for a public office holder |
|---|---|
| Selflessness | Decide only in the public interest, not for family or friends |
| Integrity | Do not take obligations that could influence official work |
| Objectivity | Choose on merit in appointments, contracts and awards |
| Accountability | Answer for decisions and accept scrutiny |
| Openness | Give reasons; restrict information only when the public interest demands |
| Honesty | Declare private interests and resolve any conflict of interest |
| Leadership | Promote these principles by example |
What the report recommends for ministers:
- A Code of Ethics in addition to the existing Code of Conduct for ministers, including the principles of the minister–civil servant relationship.
- Monitoring units in the offices of the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers, which can also receive public complaints.
- The PM or CM is responsible for ministers following both codes, even in coalition governments.
- An annual report on violations and action taken, laid before the legislature. The codes and the report should be public.
A code of conduct lists what is forbidden. A code of ethics explains what is expected. The report wants both, and wants them public.
Quick check
Give one example each of a code of ethics item and a code of conduct item for a minister.
Legislators, elections and the office of profit
How the report wants to raise ethical standards in politics, where it says integrity is decided first.
The report argues that the quality of politics is the biggest single factor in a society’s integrity. If honesty cannot survive in politics, reforms elsewhere will not hold.
For legislators:
- An Ethics Commissioner for each House of Parliament, working under the Speaker or Chairman, modelled on the UK’s Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards.
- For State legislatures: a code of ethics and conduct, ethics committees with clear sanctions, a register of members’ interests, annual reports, and their own Ethics Commissioner.
- MPs and MLAs as public authorities under the RTI Act, except when doing legislative work.
For elections and parties:
- Partial state funding of elections, to reduce illegitimate funding.
- Anti-defection cases decided by the President or Governor on the Election Commission’s advice, not by the Speaker.
- Disqualify candidates facing charges for grave and heinous offences and corruption, by amending Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
- A collegium (PM, Lok Sabha Speaker, Leader of Opposition, Law Minister, Rajya Sabha Deputy Chairman) to recommend Election Commissioners.
- Special election tribunals under Article 323B to decide election petitions within six months.
The office of profit rule stops legislators from holding posts that make them dependent on the government. The report offers a clear test: purely advisory roles are fine; roles that control public money or take executive decisions disqualify.
By that test, it says, a legislator choosing projects and spending public money is doing executive work. So it recommends abolishing MPLADS and MLALADS, the local area development schemes.
Advising the government is acceptable for a legislator. Spending public money on chosen projects is executive work, and the report wants it ended.
Quick check
Why does the report recommend abolishing MPLADS?
Civil servants, regulators and judges
Codes for the permanent bureaucracy, the professions and the judiciary.
The Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, came out of the Santhanam Committee on corruption. The report says these rules list prohibited acts but are not a code of ethics.
For civil servants:
- Public Service Values should be defined, ideally in law, and should apply to all tiers of government and parastatals. Breaking them should count as misconduct.
- Conflict of interest should be fully covered in both codes.
- No serving officials on PSU boards, except non-profit bodies and advisory bodies, since an officer cannot fairly judge a board decision he took part in.
The report points to Australia, where a 1999 law sets out Public Service Values and a Commissioner reports each year to Parliament on how far agencies follow them.
For regulators and professions: an enforceable code of conduct with statutory backing for every profession, building on bodies like the Medical Council and Bar Council.
For the judiciary: a National Judicial Council to recommend appointments of Supreme Court and High Court judges, lay down a code of conduct for all judges, inquire into misconduct and recommend removal.
| NJC member | Role |
|---|---|
| Vice-President | Chairperson |
| Prime Minister, Law Minister | Executive |
| Lok Sabha Speaker, both Leaders of Opposition | Legislature |
| Chief Justice of India | Judiciary |
| Chief Minister and High Court Chief Justice | Added only for High Court matters |
It also proposes a Supreme Court judge as Judicial Values Commissioner to enforce the judges’ code, with similar posts in High Courts.
Every group that holds public power, from a clerk to a judge, should have a written code and someone to enforce it.
Quick check
Why does the report oppose putting serving officials on the boards of public sector undertakings?
Rewriting the anti-corruption law
How the report wants to change the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, so that cases actually end in punishment.
2×
Punishment for collusive bribery
2 months
Deadline for sanction decisions
₹1 crore
Funding that brings an NGO under the Act
The Prevention of Corruption Act is India’s main law against bribery by public servants. The report says it is too narrow and too slow.
What it recommends:
- Wider definition. New offences: gross perversion of the Constitution, abuse of authority to favour or harm someone, obstruction of justice, and squandering public money.
- Collusive bribery. A special offence where the deal causes loss to the state or public. Courts should presume guilt once loss is shown, and punishment should be double.
- Damages. Corrupt officials should repay the loss they caused and pay damages on top.
- Faster trials. Time limits for each stage, special judges focused on these cases, and day-to-day hearings.
- Private sector. Cover private providers of public utilities, and NGOs that get over half their running costs, or ₹1 crore or more, from government.
The biggest roadblock it found was sanction for prosecution: government permission needed before a public servant can be tried. CVC data for 2004 showed 21 of 153 sanction requests pending for over three years.
Its fixes for sanction:
- No sanction needed when an official is caught red-handed or holds disproportionate assets.
- An empowered committee of the Central Vigilance Commissioner and the department Secretary should decide, within two months. Refusals should be reported to the legislature every year.
- The Speaker or Chairman should grant sanction for MPs and MLAs.
Justice delayed by a sanction file is protection for the corrupt. The report wants a decision in two months, by people outside the department’s chain of loyalty.
Quick check
What is ‘collusive bribery’ in the report, and how should it be punished?
Whistleblowers, benami property and serious frauds
Three gaps the report wanted closed quickly: protecting informers, seizing ill-gotten assets, and handling big frauds.
A whistleblower is an insider who reports fraud or corruption. Without protection, such people risk their careers and even their lives.
On whistleblowers, the report wants a law at once that:
- Keeps the informer’s identity confidential and protects them from victimisation at work.
- Covers corporate whistleblowers too.
- Makes harassment of, or retaliation against, a whistleblower a crime with heavy penalties.
On illegal assets: enact the Corrupt Public Servants (Forfeiture of Property) Bill suggested by the Law Commission, and actually implement the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. A benami transaction is property held in someone else’s name to hide the real owner.
On big frauds: a new law on serious economic offences and a Serious Frauds Office attached to the Cabinet Secretariat, absorbing the existing SFIO.
| Test | When a fraud counts as a serious economic offence |
|---|---|
| Size | Involves more than ₹10 crore |
| Public concern | Likely to cause widespread public concern |
| Expertise | Needs specialised knowledge of markets, banks or finance |
| Reach | Has significant international dimensions |
| Complexity | Needs legal, financial and investigative skills together |
Without protection for the person who speaks up, most corruption is never reported at all.
Quick check
Name three protections the report wants for whistleblowers.
Article 311 and protecting the honest officer
The report’s most controversial idea, and the balance it tries to strike.
Article 311 says a civil servant cannot be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without an inquiry and a fair hearing, and not by an authority lower than the one that appointed them.
The report argues that decades of court rulings around this Article have made punishment slow and uncertain. It says no other Constitution gives this kind of guarantee, and that the dishonest gain most from it.
What it recommends:
- Repeal Articles 311 and 310 (the latter is the "doctrine of pleasure").
- Pass a law under Article 309 covering all service conditions, including protection for honest action taken in the public interest and safeguards against arbitrary punishment.
It adds that judicial review and the rule of law would still protect employees from arbitrary action, even without Article 311.
But the report also worries about the opposite problem: honest officers who are afraid to decide anything. Chapter 7 says a genuine commercial loss should not automatically become a vigilance case.
Safeguards for the honest officer:
- Screen every complaint to check that it is specific, credible and verifiable before any inquiry.
- Keep early verification secret, so an innocent officer’s reputation is not damaged.
- Prosecute only when evidence is strong.
- A special unit under the Lokpal or Lokayukta to investigate complaints against investigating agencies themselves.
Punish the corrupt quickly, but do not punish the honest for taking a decision that later went wrong.
Fact vs judgement
That Article 311 slows punishment is the Commission’s judgement. Critics argue it protects officers who give frank advice from political revenge, which was Sardar Patel’s reason for supporting it. Article 311 has not been repealed. A good answer presents both sides.
Quick check
If Article 311 were repealed, how would the report still protect civil servants?
Watchdogs: Rashtriya Lokayukta, Lokayuktas and local ombudsmen
The institutions the report designs to investigate corruption in high and low places.
India had many anti-corruption bodies, such as the Central Vigilance Commission, the CBI, State Lokayuktas and Anti-Corruption Bureaus. The report says their roles overlapped and none gave the fight a single focus.
It wanted the long-pending Lokpal Bill passed, but redesigned. It proposed a constitutional national ombudsman called the Rashtriya Lokayukta, a name chosen to link it with State Lokayuktas.
Three-tier ombudsman design in the report
Anti-corruption ombudsmen
Corruption cases only, not general grievances
Rashtriya Lokayukta (national)
Constitutional
Union Ministers except the PM, all Chief Ministers, MPs, and officials of Union Minister rank
Lokayukta (each State)
Mandatory by Constitution
State Ministers and MLAs; a three-member State Vigilance Commission handles officials
Local bodies ombudsman
For a group of districts
Corruption or maladministration in panchayats and municipalities
Design of the Rashtriya Lokayukta:
- Members. A serving or retired Supreme Court judge as chair, an eminent jurist, and the Central Vigilance Commissioner as ex-officio member.
- Selection. By the Vice-President, PM, Leader of Opposition, Lok Sabha Speaker and Chief Justice of India.
- Tenure. One term of three years, with no government office afterwards (except becoming Chief Justice of India).
- Extra duty. A national campaign to raise ethical standards in public life.
Why leave out the Prime Minister? The report argues that a formal inquiry, even on baseless charges, would weaken the PM’s authority and paralyse government. Parliament, it says, is the right forum to judge a PM.
The State Lokayukta would be a three-member body: a judicial chair, an eminent jurist or administrator, and the head of the State Vigilance Commission. Anti-Corruption Bureaus would come under that Commission.
One chain of watchdogs, from the national level to the village: the Rashtriya Lokayukta, the State Lokayukta and the local ombudsman.
Quick check
Why did the report keep the Prime Minister outside the Rashtriya Lokayukta’s jurisdiction?
Citizens, media and systemic reforms
Prevention, not just punishment: how the report wants to remove opportunities for corruption.
The report says fighting corruption only with more commissions and codes has limited effect. Prevention means redesigning systems so that bribes become unnecessary or impossible.
It cites working examples: computerised railway bookings that removed middlemen, Karnataka’s Common Entrance Test, valuation tables for stamp duty in Maharashtra, and e-Seva in Andhra Pradesh and FRIENDS in Kerala for paying bills at one counter.
Citizens and society:
- Citizens’ Charter with clear service levels and a remedy when they are not met.
- Social audit built into the guidelines of every development scheme.
- A False Claims Act on the US model: any citizen can sue over a false claim against the government; the guilty pay five times the loss, and the citizen gets a share.
- Media to screen allegations carefully and evolve a self-regulating code; government to disclose corruption cases regularly.
Systemic reforms:
| Reform | What it changes |
|---|---|
| Competition | Each ministry to find monopolies it can open to competition, within a year |
| Simpler procedures | Single window, fewer layers, time limits, and "positive silence" (permission deemed granted after a deadline) |
| IT | Re-engineer a process first, then computerise it |
| Integrity pact | Bidders and government sign anti-bribery commitments for big contracts |
| Less discretion | List discretionary powers, remove them or bound them with rules; key decisions by committee |
| Supervision | Officers’ appraisal to record what they did to control corruption below them |
| Risk profiling | Officers reviewed by eminent persons after 10 years of service, then every 5 years |
| Vigilance database | A public national database of all corruption cases |
The report borrows Gladstone’s line: government should make it easy to do good and difficult to do evil.
Quick check
What is ‘positive silence’ and how does it fight corruption?
Difficult terms in simple words
Fifteen terms you will meet again and again, each with a plain meaning and an example.
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Ethics | Standards of right conduct a society sets for itself. Example: Not using an official car for a family wedding |
| Probity | Strict honesty and uprightness in public life. Example: Refusing a gift from a contractor whose bill you will approve |
| Code of ethics | Broad values that guide behaviour. Example: Act impartially and in the public interest |
| Code of conduct | Specific, enforceable dos and don’ts. Example: Declare assets every year |
| Conflict of interest | When personal interest could sway an official decision. Example: An officer’s brother bidding for a tender the officer evaluates |
| Coercive corruption | A citizen is forced to pay for a service they are entitled to. Example: A bribe to get a birth certificate |
| Collusive corruption | Both sides gain at the public’s expense. Example: Passing a substandard road in return for a cut |
| Sanction for prosecution | Government permission needed before a public servant is tried. Example: A file pending for three years blocks a trial |
| Whistleblower | An insider who reports wrongdoing. Example: An engineer exposing fake bills in a highway project |
| Benami property | Property held in another person’s name to hide the real owner. Example: A flat in a driver’s name, paid for by an official |
| Office of profit | A post under government that could make a legislator dependent on it. Example: Chairing a board that spends public funds |
| Ombudsman | An independent official who investigates complaints against authorities. Example: Lokpal, Lokayukta |
| Social audit | Citizens checking a scheme’s records and work on the ground. Example: A village meeting reading out MGNREGA muster rolls |
| Integrity pact | A signed promise by bidders and the buyer not to bribe, with an outside monitor. Example: Used in large public procurement |
| Discretion | Freedom to decide either way. Example: An inspector who can approve or reject without clear criteria |
How it works, with everyday examples
Follow a single corruption complaint through the report’s proposed system, then see the ideas through simple pictures.
The steps below combine several recommendations into one simplified journey. Real cases may skip steps or follow other routes.
Journey of a complaint against a senior official
Complaint received
From a citizen, a whistleblower whose identity is protected, or an audit finding
Screening
Is it specific, credible and verifiable? If not, it is closed quietly
Secret verification
Checked without alerting anyone, to protect an honest officer’s name
Permission to investigate
Given by the CVC with the department Secretary, within 30 days
Sanction to prosecute
Empowered committee decides within 2 months; none needed if caught red-handed
Fast trial
Special judge, day-to-day hearings, double penalty if collusive, plus damages
Each analogy below is labelled. Analogies help understanding; they are not legal descriptions.
| Idea | Analogy → fact |
|---|---|
| Code of ethics vs conduct | Analogy: a school’s motto versus its rule book. Fact: Ministers had a conduct code but no ethics code |
| Klitgaard formula | Analogy: a single ticket counter, a clerk who can refuse anyone, and no CCTV. Fact: Monopoly plus discretion minus accountability equals corruption |
| Sanction delays | Analogy: a referee who must ask the team captain before showing a red card. Fact: 21 of 153 sanction cases were pending over three years in 2004 |
| Positive silence | Analogy: a form that counts as accepted if no one replies in time. Fact: Deemed permission after a deadline |
| Integrity pact | Analogy: all players sign a fair-play pledge before the match. Fact: Anti-bribery agreement in big contracts |
Indian examples from the report:
- Railway reservations: computerisation removed touts and made bookings transparent.
- Liberalisation: once telephones, cement and two-wheelers had more suppliers, bribes to get them largely disappeared.
- Mudgal case (1951): Parliament expelled an MP, Mudgal, for misconduct even though he offered to resign. The report holds it up as the early standard of probity.
When competition and technology arrived, corruption in railway tickets and telephone connections fell sharply, a lesson the report wants applied everywhere.
Quick check
Using the Klitgaard formula, explain why online railway booking reduced corruption.
Why does this matter?
Who gains, who loses, and the trade-offs that make these recommendations contested.
Corruption is not only a moral problem. The report says better governance, especially rule of law and absence of graft, can raise GDP growth. It also hits the poor hardest, because they depend most on public services.
| Who | How the report affects them |
|---|---|
| Citizens | Charters, social audit and simpler procedures cut everyday bribes |
| Honest officials | Screening of complaints and secret verification protect their reputations |
| Corrupt officials | Faster sanction, double penalty for collusion, damages and asset forfeiture |
| Politicians | Ethics codes, ethics commissioners, an ombudsman and stricter disqualification |
| Businesses | Integrity pacts and a law against bribery in private utilities |
The big trade-offs:
- Speed of punishment vs security of tenure. Repealing Article 311 makes punishment faster but may expose officers to political revenge.
- Accountability vs decisiveness. More vigilance can make officers afraid to take any decision. The report’s answer is protection for honest mistakes.
- PM accountability vs stable government. Keeping the PM outside the ombudsman protects government stability but leaves the most powerful office outside independent scrutiny.
- Codes vs culture. Codes can be written in a day; a culture of integrity takes generations, as the report itself admits.
Every safeguard against the corrupt can also be used against the honest. The report’s challenge is to tell them apart.
Quick check
Name one trade-off in the report and which way it leaned.
What the report actually says
Separate what is data, what is advice, and what has actually happened since 2007.
Facts, recommendations and interpretations are different things. UPSC rewards answers that keep them apart.
Facts and data (as presented in the report):
- CVC annual report 2004: of 153 sanction cases, 21 were pending over three years, 26 for two to three years and 25 for one to two years.
- At the start of 2005, the CBI had 4,130 corruption cases pending trial and disposed of 265 that year.
- The UN General Assembly adopted the UN Convention against Corruption in October 2003.
Recommendations (what the 2nd ARC wants done):
- Codes of ethics for ministers, legislators, civil servants, regulators and judges, with enforcement bodies.
- A wider Prevention of Corruption Act, collusive bribery, faster sanction and trials, and private-sector coverage.
- Whistleblower law, asset forfeiture, a Serious Frauds Office, and repeal of Article 311.
- A constitutional Rashtriya Lokayukta, mandatory State Lokayuktas and local ombudsmen.
The Commission’s interpretations (its reading of the evidence):
- Values without institutions fade; institutions give values shape.
- Liberalisation cuts extortion but raises collusive corruption.
- Article 311 has come to protect the dishonest more than the honest.
What has happened since (as of October 2026):
| Status | Recommendation and what happened |
|---|---|
| Partly adopted | National ombudsman: the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 created a statutory (not constitutional) Lokpal, which began functioning in 2019. Unlike the report’s design, it covers the PM, with exceptions such as security and international relations |
| Passed, not in force | Whistleblower law: the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 was notified, but the government has not brought it into force, citing needed amendments on national security |
| Changed differently | Corruption law: the 2018 amendment to the PCA made giving a bribe an offence, but also added Section 17A, requiring prior approval to investigate officials, which goes against the report’s direction |
| Overtaken | Section 6A of the DSPE Act: the Supreme Court struck it down in 2014 |
| Adopted | Benami law: a 2016 amendment made the Benami Transactions Act workable |
| Not adopted | National Judicial Council: the NJAC (99th Amendment, 2014) was struck down in 2015; the collegium continues |
| Not adopted | Article 311 remains in the Constitution |
| Not adopted | MPLADS continues, with ₹5 crore per MP each year |
| Changed differently | Election Commissioners: a 2023 law uses a committee of the PM, Leader of Opposition and a Union Cabinet minister |
How to use this in answers
Present the 2nd ARC proposals as recommendations, and the 2013 Lokpal Act, the 2014 Whistle Blowers Act and the 2018 PCA amendment as what Parliament actually did. Pointing out the gap between the two is what earns marks.
Quick check
How does the Lokpal Act, 2013 differ from the report’s Rashtriya Lokayukta?
UPSC relevance
Where this report fits in each paper, and why the examiner cares.
| Paper | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Prelims | Polity and governance. Lokpal provisions, office of profit and administrative reform bodies have been asked directly |
| GS II | Transparency and accountability; role of civil services; statutory bodies. Lokpal, CVC, RTI, citizens’ charters, election reform and judicial appointments |
| GS IV | Probity in governance; codes of ethics and conduct; corruption; public service values. The report is the core source for this whole unit |
| Essay | Corruption, integrity, values vs institutions. The report’s line that values need institutions is a strong essay spine |
Quick check
UPSC-style (15 marks): “Codes of conduct exist, but a code of ethics is yet to be put in place.” Suggest a suitable model for a code of ethics in Indian public administration.
Connecting to what you already know
This report sits in the middle of topics you have already studied. Here is how they link.
Where the report sits in your syllabus
Santhanam Committee (1964)
Led to the CVC and the CCS Conduct Rules, 1964
First ARC (1966)
First proposed a Lokpal and Lokayuktas
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
The law the report wants widened
RTI Act, 2005
The report calls RTI the starting point for transparency
Lokpal Act 2013, Whistle Blowers Act 2014, PCA amendment 2018
What Parliament did later
| You know… | Link to this report |
|---|---|
| UN Convention against Corruption (2003) | Requires codes of conduct and independent preventive bodies, which the report cites |
| Articles 309–311 | The report wants 310 and 311 repealed and service rules made by law under 309 |
| Articles 102 and 191 | Office-of-profit disqualification, which the report wants clearly defined |
| Anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule) | The report wants the President or Governor, advised by the EC, to decide |
| 73rd and 74th Amendments | Local bodies gained power, so the report wants local ombudsmen and codes for them |
| Mission Karmayogi and e-governance | Modern efforts that match the report’s stress on capacity and IT |
Quick check
Which earlier committee led to the Central Vigilance Commission and the 1964 conduct rules?
Links with past UPSC questions
Real UPSC questions this report helps you answer, in Prelims and Mains.
Prelims questions this report helps with:
- 2025: statements about the Lokpal’s powers and the qualifications of its members. Knowing how the 2013 Act differs from the report’s design helps.
- 2019: the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 and whether office of profit is defined in the Constitution. The report notes it is not clearly defined and proposes a test.
- 2021: the history of administrative reform bodies in the Union Government. The ARCs are part of that story.
Mains questions: the linked Mains PYQs listed after this article are real UPSC questions. Tap one to see it in full. How this report helps:
- Code of ethics vs code of conduct (2018, 2024): the report’s distinction, the ministers’ codes and Public Service Values are the direct answer.
- Whistleblowers (2015 GS II, 2022 GS IV): use the report’s three protections and the status of the 2014 Act.
- Lokpal and immorality (2013): the report itself says institutions need values, and values need institutions.
- Why corruption persists despite codes, vigilance and RTI (2015), and corruption as failure of values (2023): use the Klitgaard formula and systemic reforms.
- Conflict of interest (2018) and social audit (2021): use the PSU board rule and the social audit recommendation.
- Public Services Code of the 2nd ARC (2016): this report sets out Public Service Values and refers to a draft Public Services Bill; the detailed code was left to the Commission’s later report on civil services.
Honest limits
Only the 2016 question names the 2nd ARC directly, and its detailed code sits in a later ARC report. The other links are conceptual, but strong: this report is the standard source for GS IV questions on probity and corruption.
What should an aspirant remember?
The high-value points, grouped so you can revise them in one pass.
Institutions and people:
- Second ARC set up 31 August 2005; chairman M. Veerappa Moily; Fourth Report, Ethics in Governance, January 2007.
- Proposed bodies: Rashtriya Lokayukta, Ethics Commissioner, National Judicial Council, Judicial Values Commissioner, Serious Frauds Office, local bodies ombudsman.
Numbers worth carrying:
- Double punishment for collusive bribery; sanction decision within 2 months; investigation permission within 30 days.
- Serious economic offence: above ₹10 crore; False Claims Act penalty: five times the loss.
- NGO under the Act if over 50% of costs or ₹1 crore comes from government; officer risk profiling after 10 years, then every 5.
Cause → effect links:
- Monopoly plus discretion minus accountability → corruption → so open up competition, cut discretion, add transparency.
- Slow sanctions and trials → corruption becomes low-risk → so time limits and special courts.
- No protection for informers → wrongdoing stays hidden → so a whistleblower law.
- Fear of vigilance → honest officers avoid decisions → so screening and secret verification.
One-minute recap
Read the chain below aloud. If you can explain each step, you understand the report.
Say this out loud
Second ARC, Moily, Fourth Report, January 2007
Rules exist; enforcement and a culture of integrity are missing
Codes of ethics plus codes of conduct for every arm of the state
Sharper corruption law: collusive bribery, faster sanction, whistleblowers
Rashtriya Lokayukta, State Lokayuktas and local ombudsmen
Repeal Article 311 but protect the honest officer
Systems beat sermons: competition, e-governance, less discretion, social audit