Why this matters for UPSC
Every scheme you study runs on public money, and this report asks a simple question: does India plan, spend, account for and audit that money well? In April 2009 the Second Administrative Reforms Commission answered in its Fourteenth Report, Strengthening Financial Management Systems. It covers budgeting, outcome budgets, fund flows to States, accrual accounting, internal audit, the Comptroller and Auditor General and Parliament’s financial committees. It feeds GS II (CAG, PAC, parliamentary control), GS III (budgeting, public expenditure management) and GS IV (accountability and probity).
What is this report about?
First, the basics: who wrote this report, when, and what exactly it was asked to fix.
14th
Report of the 2nd ARC
Apr 2009
Finalised
17
Recommendation groups
The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2nd ARC) was set up on 31 August 2005 to prepare a blueprint for reforming public administration. M. Veerappa Moily chaired it for most of its life.
One of its terms of reference was "Strengthening Financial Management Systems". It had three parts: build capacity so funds flow smoothly and accounts are kept properly, strengthen internal audit, and create a regular system of external audit that checks whether programmes deliver.
The report was finalised in April 2009 and printed in May 2009. Moily had resigned as Chairman on 31 March 2009, and the report records his role in guiding the discussions. V. Ramachandran then became Acting Chairman.
To gather views, the Commission held a national workshop with the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) in New Delhi on 23 July 2008, with officers from the Finance Ministry, the CAG’s office and the States.
In one sentence: spend money on results, not just on time, keep accounts that show what the money actually did, and make auditors faster and more useful.
The report from start to finish
31 Aug 2005
2nd ARC set up; financial management is item 4 of its terms of reference
23 Jul 2008
National workshop on financial management held with NIPFP, New Delhi
31 Mar 2009
M. Veerappa Moily resigns as Chairman
Apr 2009
Fourteenth Report, Strengthening Financial Management Systems, finalised
May 2009
Report printed
Quick check
Which three things did the 2nd ARC’s terms of reference ask it to look at under financial management?
The big picture
Six ideas carry the whole report. Learn these first and every detail later has a place to sit.
The Commission says it focused mainly on expenditure management: how the government plans, spends and checks its money. Taxation and borrowing are mentioned but not studied in depth.
- Budget honestly. Make realistic estimates, stop squeezing departments’ wish lists into a fixed total, and move to top-down limits.
- Think beyond one year. Link the Five Year Plan, the annual budget and the accounts so there is a clear line of sight from goal to rupee spent.
- Measure results. Shift from "did you spend the money?" to "what did it achieve?", starting carefully with flagship schemes.
- Follow the money. Stop treating a release of funds as spending; track it to the final payment with a modern financial information system.
- Check from inside. Create statutory Chief Internal Auditors and independent audit committees in ministries.
- Check from outside, faster. Make CAG audits timely and balanced, and get Parliament to examine every audit para within a year.
Mental map: how the report is built
Principles
Ten core principles of public finance reform
Budgeting
Realistic estimates, top-down limits, multi-year view, outcomes, end plan/non-plan split
Fund flow and accounts
Track CSS money to final payment; financial information system; accrual accounting in phases
Internal control
Chief Internal Auditor, audit committees, Financial Adviser as CFO
External audit and Parliament
Timely CAG audit, all paras examined in a year, action on pending paras
Quick check
Which part of public finance did this report focus on, and which parts did it largely leave out?
What public finance management means
The core concept in plain words, the ten principles the Commission adopted, and how budgeting styles have changed over a century.
10
Core principles adopted
7
OECD reform elements used as the base
1969
India’s first performance budgets
Public finance management is how a government raises money, decides what to spend it on, spends it, records it and checks it. Think of a household that earns, budgets, pays bills, keeps receipts and reviews the month.
For a long time, the report says, financial management in developing countries meant one thing: the Finance Ministry keeping spending departments under control by checking every input and every bill. That approach still survives.
The Commission took the common budget reforms of OECD countries as its base: medium-term frameworks, prudent economic assumptions, top-down budgeting, relaxed central input controls, a focus on results, transparency and modern financial practices. It then added Indian needs and wrote ten core principles.
- Part of governance reform. Financial reform is a means to good governance, not an end in itself.
- Everyone’s job. Financial prudence is the duty of every department, not only the Finance Ministry.
- Medium-term view. Align plans, budgets and accounts.
- Prudent assumptions. Avoid over-optimistic forecasts.
- Top-down budgeting. Start from desired outcomes and fix sector limits.
- Transparency and simplicity. Simple budget papers, simple fund release.
- Relax input controls. Give agencies more freedom over how they spend.
- Focus on results. Shift accountability from rules followed to results achieved.
- Modern tools. Accrual accounting and IT, but only after building capacity.
- Realistic budgets. Without accurate projections the budget loses credibility.
Give managers more freedom over inputs, and in return hold them to account for results. That trade is the heart of modern budgeting.
The report also traces how budgeting styles evolved:
| Style | What it means |
|---|---|
| Line-item budget | Money listed by object: salaries, travel, office expenses. Easy to control, but shows nothing about results |
| Performance budgeting | Links money to functions, activities and targets. Proposed by the First ARC’s study team (1967); first used in India in 1969 |
| Zero-based budgeting | Every activity must justify itself afresh each year. India’s Finance Ministry asked all ministries to adopt it from the 1987-88 budget |
| Programme budgeting (PPBS) | Spending grouped by objective; tried by the US federal government in the mid-1960s and judged too ambitious |
| Outcome Budget | Shows outlays, outputs and expected outcomes for each scheme. India’s first came in 2005 |
Quick check
Why did zero-based budgeting not work well in India, according to the report?
How India’s budget cycle works
Before you can see what is broken, you need to know the normal path a rupee takes from the budget speech to the audit report.
Art. 112
Annual Financial Statement
Art. 266
Consolidated Fund and Public Account
Art. 151
CAG reports laid in Parliament
The Constitution lays down the frame. Under Article 112, the government places an Annual Financial Statement, the budget, before Parliament. Some spending is "charged" on the Consolidated Fund of India and is not voted, such as the salaries of judges and the CAG.
The rest goes to the Lok Sabha as Demands for Grants. Members can move a cut motion to cut a demand: to ₹1 to disapprove a policy, by a stated amount for economy, or by ₹100 to air a grievance.
When time runs out, the Speaker puts all remaining demands to vote together. This is the guillotine, and the report notes that many demands are passed this way without discussion.
Next comes the Appropriation Act. No money can leave the Consolidated Fund without it, and anything unspent at the end of the year lapses. If money runs short, the government asks for a supplementary grant under Article 115.
Government accounts are kept on a cash basis under Rule 21 of the Government Accounting Rules, 1990. Payments are recorded when cash moves, not when the obligation arises.
The annual money cycle (simplified from the report)
Budget circular
Finance Ministry asks departments for estimates, usually in September
Budget presented
Annual Financial Statement under Article 112
Demands voted
Standing Committees examine; Lok Sabha votes; guillotine ends debate
Appropriation Act
Legal authority to withdraw money; unspent balance lapses
Accounts
Appropriation Accounts and Finance Accounts compiled
Audit and PAC
CAG audits (Articles 148–151); PAC examines
Quick check
What happens to money left unspent at the end of the financial year under the Appropriation Act?
Where the annual budget goes wrong
The Commission’s diagnosis: estimates that miss, projects that drag, and money that is announced but not planned.
60
Cases of unspent provision over ₹100 crore, 2007-08
308
Central projects with cost overruns, June 2008
49.48%
Their average cost overrun
After studying recent budgets, the Commission listed nine weaknesses:
- Unrealistic estimates. Frequent revisions and supplementary grants, yet large sums unspent at year-end.
- Delayed projects. Token provisions spread money too thin.
- Skewed spending. A big share is spent in the last quarter, especially March.
- No multi-year link. Plan schemes get scattered into budget line items.
- Release counted as spending. Accounts do not show actual use on the ground.
- Mis-stated finances. Funds parked outside government accounts.
- Ad hoc announcements. New projects announced outside the plan and budget.
- Process over outcomes. Compliance matters more than results.
- Plan/non-plan split. An artificial divide that wastes resources.
The CAG’s report on Union accounts for 2007-08 found unspent amounts above ₹100 crore in 60 cases across 47 grants. In 24 sections of 20 grants, savings of ₹100 crore or more had recurred for three straight years.
In 25 cases that year, departments took supplementary grants expecting to spend more, yet ended up spending less than even their original grant.
Asking for extra money and then failing to spend even the original amount is the clearest sign of a budget built on guesswork.
The Commission traced the root cause to method. Departments send detailed bids, which are then forced into a predetermined total, or estimates are simply projected from past trends. It wanted this replaced by top-down budgeting: fix an overall limit for each ministry first and let the ministry allocate within it.
Projects told a similar story. Of 901 central projects monitored by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation in June 2008, 308 had cost overruns. Railways had by far the most of them, 189 projects.
Cost overrun in projects that overran, selected sectors (June 2008)
- Railways (189 projects)113.96%
- Steel (11 projects)41.55%
- Petroleum (15 projects)33.09%
- Coal (16 projects)22.07%
- Power (24 projects)15.56%
Quick check
What did the Commission see as the root cause of unrealistic budget estimates?
The March rush and ad hoc announcements
Why so much money is spent at the end of the year, and why surprise announcements distort the plan.
15%
Max share of budget to spend in March
33%
Max share in the last quarter
23
Demands for Grants under the new system
Charts of monthly spending from April 2004 to February 2009 show a sharp spike every March, for both plan and non-plan spending. Money lapses on 31 March, so departments rush to use it.
To curb this, the Finance Ministry started a Modified Cash Management System in December 2006. Each covered department prepares a Monthly Expenditure Plan, with limits on how much it can spend in March and in the last quarter.
The report found the rush continued. In 2007-08 several large ministries could not spend 67% of their plan budget in the first three quarters. The Commission wanted the system strictly followed and extended to all Demands for Grants.
When money lapses on 31 March, the deadline, not the need, starts deciding how it is spent.
A second problem is politics. Projects are announced in budgets, on national days such as Independence Day, and during VIP visits to States, often as "packages". They distort plan allocations and are sometimes never formally approved, leaving people disappointed.
The Commission asked for this practice to stop. Truly essential projects should enter the annual plan or the mid-term appraisal, and the budget should include projects only after proper scrutiny, not as token provisions.
Cause → effect: the year-end spending rush
Funds lapse on 31 March
Unspent money is lost
Slow early spending
Late releases and weak planning
March rush
Hasty spending, weaker value for money
Quick check
What two limits does the Monthly Expenditure Plan place on year-end spending?
Multi-year budgeting and a clear line of sight
Why a one-year budget cannot deliver five-year goals, and what the Commission borrowed from the United Kingdom.
3–5 yrs
Span of a multi-year budget
1998
UK’s Comprehensive Spending Review
~2/3
UK spending aligned before its reform
A new scheme rarely pays off in one year. Yet India budgets one year at a time, while its goals sat in Five Year Plans. The report says plan allocations get scattered across many budget heads, and the accounts show spending only by head, not by scheme.
So nobody can easily trace a rupee from the plan goal to the budget line to the final account. The report calls the missing link a "clear line of sight".
The UK offered a model. Since its 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review, each department gets a firm three-year limit, the Departmental Expenditure Limit. Volatile items such as social security sit outside it as Annually Managed Expenditure.
Departments can carry unspent money into the next year. This End Year Flexibility removed the incentive for a year-end spending spree.
The UK also ran an "Alignment" or "Clear Line of Sight" project, because only about two-thirds of its spending was presented on the same basis in budgets, Parliament’s estimates and the final accounts.
If the plan, the budget and the accounts speak three different languages, no one can tell whether the money achieved anything.
The Commission did not copy the UK. It asked for a High Powered Committee to examine medium-term spending limits for ministries, linked to annual budgets with a carry-forward facility, and a similar alignment project for India. This is the idea behind a medium-term expenditure framework.
Quick check
What is End Year Flexibility, and what problem does it solve?
From outlays to outcomes
Why counting money spent is not the same as counting results, and why the Commission wanted the plan/non-plan split abolished.
2005
First Outcome Budget
2007-08
Outcome and Performance Budgets merged
40 yrs
Committees urging an end to plan/non-plan
Departments usually judged themselves by whether they spent their budget. The Outcome Budget, introduced in 2005-06, tried to change that by showing three things for each scheme.
Outlays → outputs → outcomes
Outlay
Money spent, e.g. on building rural godowns
Output
What is produced, e.g. tonnes of storage built
Outcome
What changes for people, e.g. fewer distress sales by farmers
The report found the idea poorly applied. In many ministries, outputs and outcomes were mixed up. Some simply repeated output targets as outcomes, and some wrote general intentions instead.
In the 2008-09 Outcome Budget, the rural godowns scheme listed "construction or renovation of 15 lakh tonnes of storage" as both its output and its outcome. A textiles secretariat entry left both columns blank.
The Commission’s view was realistic. Outcomes are hard to measure because many factors affect them. Rural electrification, for example, changes outcomes in education, health and farming. So it advised starting with proper preparation and training in flagship schemes and national priorities, instead of declaring outcome budgets for everything.
An outcome budget cannot be created by declaration. It needs preparation, training and honest measures.
It also attacked the plan and non-plan expenditure split. "Plan" money went to new schemes in the Five Year Plan; "non-plan" money covered salaries, maintenance, interest and subsidies. Over time, non-plan spending came to be seen as wasteful.
The results were real: new projects kept starting while existing assets were not maintained, and bans on non-plan posts hurt health and education services. The Commission recommended that the distinction be done away with.
Quick check
Why did the Commission say the plan/non-plan distinction should be abolished?
Following the money in centrally sponsored schemes
What happens after the Centre releases money for a scheme, and why the accounts lose track of it.
₹51,260 cr
Sent directly to State and district bodies, 2007-08 (RE)
~1,000
Schemes to be tracked by CPSMS
15-digit
Old accounting code, hard to read by scheme
Centrally Sponsored Schemes are funded by the Union but run by States, often on subjects outside the Union List. Money reaches the ground in two ways: through the State’s Consolidated Fund, or directly to State and district societies and agencies through banks.
The direct route was meant to avoid delays and stop States diverting scheme money. But it created a new problem. The moment the Centre releases money, its accounts record it as spent, even if the money sits unused in an agency’s bank account.
For 2007-08, the Union planned to send ₹51,259.85 crore (revised estimate) directly to such bodies. The CAG noted that the unspent balances lying with them could not be worked out, so government spending shown in the accounts was overstated. This is parking of funds.
A release is not an expenditure. Money spent is money that reached a beneficiary or a supplier.
The Commission backed a fix being designed by the Controller General of Accounts: a Core Accounting System linked to banks’ core banking systems. Only sanctions would travel down the chain, and the bank would pay out only when the field agency actually spends.
In the report’s words, "authorisation to spend" would flow, not "funds to spend". This needs a new, common Chart of Accounts that can show scheme, recipient agency and location.
It also wanted a financial information system on the lines of Brazil’s SIAFI, used across Brazil’s federal government since 1987, with real-time spending data open to the public. It linked this to the spirit of the Right to Information.
Old route vs proposed route for scheme money
Old: Centre releases cash
Booked as spent at once
Old: agency parks it in a bank
Unspent balance invisible to government accounts
New: Centre issues a sanction
Tagged with scheme, agency and location
New: bank pays at the final payment
Expenditure booked only when money actually reaches the payee
Quick check
Why did the CAG say government expenditure was overstated in the 2007-08 accounts?
Cash vs accrual accounting
The difference between recording cash and recording obligations, and why the Commission advised caution.
5
Stages in GASAB’s transition roadmap
10–12 yrs
Expected transition period
2–3 yrs
To show gains in pilot units
Cash accounting records money when it is paid or received. Accrual accounting records income when it is earned and costs when they are incurred, whether or not cash has moved. It also counts assets, their wear and tear (depreciation) and future liabilities such as pensions.
The Twelfth Finance Commission listed the weaknesses of cash accounting. It hides liabilities like unfunded pensions, does not track assets or their upkeep, cannot show the full cost of a service, and lets governments defer payments to make one year look better.
Indian Railways already uses a modified accrual system for its commercial accounts. The GASAB in the CAG’s office prepared a roadmap in 2007 with five stages, from accruing current expenses to full accrual.
Cash accounting tells you what you paid this year. Accrual accounting tells you what you own, what you owe and what a service really costs.
But the report also recorded the risks. Transition is costly, needs skilled accountants, can take more than a decade, and involves judgement calls on asset values that leave room for "creative accounting".
It noted that the Netherlands had retraced its steps, Japan had decided against it, and South Africa had reverted. An earlier Indian committee under A.C. Tiwari had called it untested and not cost-effective.
What the report recommends:
- A Task Force first. Study costs and benefits, including the effect on Appropriation and Finance Accounts.
- Pilot where it pays. Begin in a few departments, especially departmental commercial undertakings, where gains can show within 2–3 years.
- Expert review. A committee studies the pilots before any wider, phased rollout.
- Train people. Address training needs of accounts staff and decision makers in advance.
- Prerequisites. Align plan, budget and accounts, and build a financial information system before adopting it.
Quick check
Name two benefits and two risks of accrual accounting mentioned in the report.
Internal audit and the Financial Adviser
Why internal audit in ministries was weak, the Chief Internal Auditor the report proposed, and the new role for Financial Advisers.
~70%
Health plan funds outside internal audit (CAG, 2006)
447
Units due for audit; 104–132 actually audited a year
1975
Integrated Financial Adviser scheme begins
Internal audit is a check run from inside an organisation, by its own auditors, to make sure rules are followed and risks are controlled. In ministries, it sat under the Chief Controllers of Accounts, who also handled payments and accounts.
CAG reports from 2006 showed how weak it was. In the Department of Health, programmes worth about 70% of plan allocation were kept out of internal audit. The Department of Information Technology had no internal audit wing at all.
Urban Development had 447 units due for audit every year but audited only 104 to 132 a year. No training, no risk-based plans, and little action on findings.
A CAG task force set up in July 2006 at the Finance Ministry’s request surveyed 15 ministries. It found no standards, no separation between auditors and the people whose payments they checked, and no direct reporting to the Secretary.
An auditor who reports to the same officer who approved the payment is not independent. Separation is the first rule of audit.
The task force admired the US Inspector General model, created by a 1978 law, and suggested an interim Board of Internal Audit. The Commission rejected the board and proposed its own design.
What the report recommends:
- A Chief Internal Auditor by statute. Start in select ministries running big programmes, such as those under Bharat Nirman, with independence and duties set by law.
- Report to the Secretary. The CIA answers directly to the Secretary of the department.
- CAG sets standards. Internal audit standards come from the CAG, with rules to avoid duplicating its work.
- Separate accounts from audit. Accounting staff should not audit themselves; investigation of frauds goes to specialised agencies.
- An independent Audit Committee. In every ministry: an eminent public figure as chair plus two outside members, appointed by the Minister, reporting yearly to the Departmentally related Standing Committee.
The Integrated Financial Adviser scheme began in 1975 and was revised in June 2006, when the Finance Ministry described the Financial Adviser’s role as akin to a corporate Chief Finance Officer.
The Commission wanted that role recognised fully: the Financial Adviser answers to the Secretary of the ministry, not to both the ministry and the Finance Ministry. It asked that only officers trained in modern financial management be posted to the job.
Quick check
To whom should the proposed Chief Internal Auditor report, and who should set internal audit standards?
CAG, Parliament and external audit
How the CAG and Parliament’s committees check the executive, why the system is slow, and how the report wanted to speed it up.
1,000–1,500
Paras in CAG’s Union reports each year
10–15
Paras the PAC actually discusses
30 Sep
Proposed deadline for finishing audits
The CAG is created by Article 148 and reports under Article 151. Its duties are set out in the CAG’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971. It does financial, compliance, performance audit and IT audits, and the report calls it a pillar of democratic accountability.
Its reports go to Parliament’s financial committees:
| Committee | What it does |
|---|---|
| Public Accounts Committee | 22 members (15 Lok Sabha, 7 Rajya Sabha). Examines CAG reports and the Appropriation and Finance Accounts |
| Estimates Committee | 30 Lok Sabha members. Suggests economies and efficiency in the estimates; demands can be voted even without its report |
| Committee on Public Undertakings | 22 members. Examines CAG reports on public sector undertakings |
| Departmentally related Standing Committees | Set up in 1993, up to 31 members each. Examine Demands for Grants but cannot suggest cut motions |
The bottleneck is volume. The PAC selects about 25 to 30 of the 1,000 to 1,500 paras each year and manages to discuss only 10 to 15. Departments take seriously only the paras the PAC picks up, and their Action Taken Notes on the rest are often a formality.
An audit para that no one examines, and no officer answers, is an expensive piece of paper.
Officers also complain about audit. Reports arrive years after the event, rely only on files, focus on faults, rarely credit good work and can make officers afraid to innovate.
What the report recommends:
- Examine every para in a year. PAC and COPU split paras among themselves, new sub-committees and the Standing Committees at the start of each year. Leftovers go to departmental Audit Committees.
- Balanced reporting. Audit reports should acknowledge good performance, not only criticise.
- Talk more. Regular senior-level meetings, and a quarterly letter from the Accountant General to each Administrative Secretary on key findings.
- Faster audit. Finish all audits for a year by 30 September of the next year; start with 31 December and advance it gradually; use IT.
- Answer audit. Keep a database of pending audit para replies in every ministry, and act against officers who persistently fail to reply.
The report also noted that, as of October 2007, ministries had not sent remedial Action Taken Notes on 169 paragraphs, and that replies to draft paras are due within six weeks.
Quick check
What deadline did the Commission propose for completing external audits, and how should it be phased in?
Financial management in the States
The Commission did not study State budgets in depth, but said the same weaknesses apply there. Here is what it singled out.
14,715
Audit paras pending before State PACs/COPUs, March 2006
4 yrs
Rolling estimates beyond the budget year
2003
Karnataka’s Fiscal Responsibility Act
State departments have very limited financial powers, so most proposals go to the Finance Department. The Commission wanted States to adopt the Financial Adviser system in departments, along with more delegation, after first building capacity.
It asked States to move to multi-year budgeting: give estimates for four years beyond the budget year, on a rolling basis, so the full cost of ongoing projects is visible. It praised Karnataka’s Medium Term Fiscal Plan, prepared since 2001-02, and noted that Karnataka was the first State to pass a Fiscal Responsibility Act, in 2003.
CAG reports showed internal audit in States in poor shape. In Andhra Pradesh’s health department, two audit officers covered more than 100 offices and 1,703 drawing and disbursing officers.
External audit follow-up was worse. As of 31 March 2006, 14,715 paras and reviews were pending before State PACs and COPUs, some dating back to 1983-84. Some committees took up old reports in order, so they ended up examining matters 10 to 20 years old.
Examining a 15-year-old audit para is like investigating a road accident after the road has been rebuilt twice.
What the report recommends for States:
- Realistic estimates. Analyse the gap between estimates and actuals every year.
- No ad hoc announcements. Stop token provisions that starve ongoing projects.
- Even spending. Adopt a Monthly Expenditure Plan like the Union’s.
- Stronger internal audit. Make it strategic, reporting to the head of the organisation, with audit committees.
- Time limits. Legislature committees and departments’ Action Taken Notes should follow fixed time frames.
Quick check
Why does the Commission want States to show budget estimates for four years beyond the budget year?
Difficult terms in simple words
Sixteen terms you will meet again and again, each with a plain meaning and an example.
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Expenditure management | Planning, allocating, spending and checking public money well. Example: fixing ministry limits, then tracking what the money achieved |
| Line-item budget | Budget listed by object of spending. Example: separate ceilings for salaries, travel and office expenses |
| Zero-based budgeting | Every activity justified from zero each year. Example: an old scheme must prove it is still needed to get any money |
| Outlay | Money provided for a scheme. Example: the budget for building rural godowns |
| Output | The physical result of spending. Example: lakh tonnes of storage built |
| Outcome | The change in people’s lives. Example: fewer farmers forced into distress sales |
| Supplementary grant | Extra money approved during the year under Article 115. Example: a ministry asks Parliament for more in December |
| Guillotine | Putting all remaining demands to vote at once when debate time ends. Example: dozens of ministries’ demands passed without discussion |
| Top-down budgeting | Fix the total first, then let ministries allocate within it. Example: a ministry gets a ceiling and chooses its own priorities |
| End Year Flexibility | Permission to carry unspent money into the next year. Example: UK departments under their spending limits |
| Parking of funds | Money released to an agency that sits unused in a bank. Example: scheme funds lying in a district society’s account |
| Chart of Accounts | The coding structure for recording transactions. Example: heads and sub-heads that tag a payment to a scheme |
| Accrual accounting | Recording income when earned and costs when incurred. Example: counting a pension liability while the employee is still working |
| Internal audit | An organisation’s own check on its processes and risks. Example: a ministry team testing payments in field offices |
| Audit para | A finding included in a CAG audit report. Example: a para on a project’s cost overrun |
| Action Taken Note | A ministry’s written reply on what it did about an audit para. Example: a note on recovering an excess payment |
How it actually works
Follow one rupee of a centrally sponsored scheme from Parliament to a village, and see where each recommendation fits.
The steps below simplify the system the report describes. Each step shows a weakness and the fix proposed for it.
One rupee’s journey, with the report’s fixes
Estimate
Department guesses its needs → fix: top-down ceiling and realistic assumptions
Budget and vote
Parliament approves for one year → fix: multi-year limits with carry-forward
Release
Centre sends cash to a district society → fix: send a sanction, pay at the point of use
Spending on the ground
Rush in March, outputs not outcomes → fix: monthly plans and outcome budgets
Internal check
Weak internal audit → fix: Chief Internal Auditor and audit committee
External check
Late CAG report, few paras examined → fix: audit by 30 Sep, all paras in a year
Each recommendation plugs one leak in the same pipe: the pipe that carries public money from Parliament to the citizen.
What the numbers actually mean:
- Unspent money is not saved money. Large unspent provisions mean planned services did not happen on time, and the borrowed money still cost interest.
- Cost overruns are averages. The 49.48% figure covers only the 308 projects that overran, not all 901 monitored projects.
- Pending paras measure response, not just fraud. Thousands of pending paras show weak follow-up, which is why the report wants consequences for officers who do not reply.
Analogies:
Each analogy below is labelled. Analogies help understanding; they are not how the law or the report describes things.
| Idea | Analogy → fact |
|---|---|
| Top-down budgeting | Analogy: a family fixes the monthly grocery limit first, then decides what to buy. Fact: ministries get aggregate limits and reallocate within them |
| March rush | Analogy: a student who writes all assignments the night before the deadline. Fact: spending spikes in the last quarter and in March |
| Parking of funds | Analogy: transferring pocket money to a child’s piggy bank and calling it spent. Fact: releases booked as expenditure while money sits in agency accounts |
| Accrual accounting | Analogy: noting the electricity bill when the meter runs, not when you pay it. Fact: costs recorded when incurred |
| Chief Internal Auditor | Analogy: a referee from inside the league but not on either team. Fact: statutory independence, reporting to the Secretary |
Quick check
In the report’s proposed system, when would expenditure on a centrally sponsored scheme be booked in the Union’s accounts?
Why does this matter?
Who gains, who loses, and the trade-offs that make financial reform hard.
Every scheme you study, from rural roads to school meals, depends on this machinery. If estimates are wrong, money lapses. If funds are parked, schemes look funded but nothing happens. If audit is late, mistakes repeat.
Good schemes fail quietly when the money behind them is planned badly, tracked poorly and checked too late.
| Who | How the report affects them |
|---|---|
| Citizens and beneficiaries | Money that reaches the ground on time, and public data on spending |
| Ministries and agencies | More freedom within ceilings, but accountability for results |
| Finance Ministry | Steps back from micro-control and checks totals and reallocations |
| CAG and Accountants General | Faster, more balanced audits and closer contact with the executive |
| Parliament and legislatures | Every audit para examined within a year |
| States | Multi-year budgets, Financial Advisers, internal audit, time limits on follow-up |
The big trade-offs:
- Control vs freedom. Relaxing input controls helps managers, but needs strong results-based accountability in return.
- Speed vs scrutiny. Sending money directly to agencies avoids delays but weakens legislative control and visibility.
- Ambition vs capacity. Accrual accounting and outcome budgets promise much, but fail without trained people and systems.
- Audit independence vs partnership. Auditors must stay independent, yet the report wants them to work more closely with the executive and credit good work.
Quick check
Name one trade-off the report tries to balance in reforming financial management.
What the report actually says
Separate the data, the recommendations and the Commission’s judgement, then see what happened later.
Facts, recommendations and interpretations are different things. UPSC rewards answers that keep them apart.
Facts and data (as reported):
- Unspent provisions above ₹100 crore in 60 cases of 47 grants in 2007-08 (CAG).
- 308 of 901 monitored central projects had cost overruns averaging 49.48% (June 2008).
- ₹51,259.85 crore planned for direct transfer to State and district bodies in 2007-08, with unspent balances unknown.
- 14,715 audit paras pending before State PACs and COPUs on 31 March 2006.
Recommendations (what the 2nd ARC wanted done):
- Realistic, audited assumptions and top-down budgeting; no token provisions or ad hoc announcements.
- The Modified Cash Management System extended to all Demands for Grants.
- A High Powered Committee on medium-term limits and plan-budget-accounts alignment.
- Outcome budgeting begun carefully with flagship schemes; the plan/non-plan distinction abolished.
- Sanction-based fund flow under the CGA, a new Chart of Accounts and a SIAFI-style financial information system.
- A task force and pilots before any move to accrual accounting.
- Statutory Chief Internal Auditors, independent audit committees, Financial Advisers answerable to Secretaries.
- All audit paras examined within a year, audits finished by 30 September, and a database of pending paras.
The Commission’s interpretations:
- Financial reform is part of governance reform, not a separate technical exercise.
- Internal audit in India was "in its infancy" compared with international practice.
- The proven benefits of accrual accounting were not yet conclusive.
What happened later (verified status):
| Area | What happened |
|---|---|
| Plan/non-plan split | Removed from the Union Budget from 2017-18, after the Five Year Plans and the Planning Commission ended (NITI Aayog replaced the Commission in 2015) |
| Budget calendar | Union Budget presented on 1 February from 2017-18, so money is approved before the year begins; the Railway Budget was merged into it |
| Tracking scheme money | The Central Plan Scheme Monitoring System begun in 2008-09 grew into the PFMS; since 2021 CSS funds flow through single nodal agency accounts so money is released closer to the time it is used |
| Medium-term view | The FRBM Act was amended in 2012 to add a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework Statement, presented with the budget |
| Outcome budget | Replaced from 2017-18 by an Output-Outcome Monitoring Framework, with NITI Aayog tracking indicators |
| Accrual accounting | Union Government accounts are still kept on a cash basis; GASAB continues to work on accounting standards |
| Chief Internal Auditor | No statute creating Chief Internal Auditors in ministries has been passed |
Status as of October 2026
The ideas that needed no new law moved furthest: the plan/non-plan split is gone, the budget date moved earlier, and scheme money is now tracked through PFMS and nodal accounts. The structural audit reforms, such as a statutory Chief Internal Auditor and a 30 September audit deadline, have not been adopted in the form proposed. In answers, present these as the report’s recommendations and then add the later developments.
Quick check
Which 2nd ARC budgeting recommendation was clearly implemented by the Union Government in 2017-18?
UPSC relevance
Where this report fits in each paper, and how it links to topics you already know.
| Paper | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Prelims | Polity and economy. CAG articles, PAC and Estimates Committee composition, cut motions, guillotine, Consolidated Fund, plan/non-plan, FRBM statements |
| GS II | Parliament, constitutional bodies, accountability. CAG’s role and limits, PAC, Standing Committees, audit follow-up |
| GS III | Government budgeting, public expenditure. Outcome budgets, March rush, multi-year frameworks, CSS fund flow, accrual accounting |
| GS IV | Accountability, probity, public funds. Answerability for results, audit response, transparency in spending |
| Essay | Governance and trust. "Every rupee must be traceable" and "from outlays to outcomes" are ready frames |
Where this report sits in your syllabus
Constitution
Arts 112–117 budget; Art. 266 and 267 funds; Arts 148–151 CAG; Art. 150 form of accounts
Laws and rules
CAG (DPC) Act 1971; FRBM Act 2003; GFR 2005; Government Accounting Rules 1990
Parliament
PAC, Estimates Committee, COPU, Standing Committees (1993)
Other 2nd ARC reports
Ethics in Governance (serious frauds agency), Local Governance (accrual accounts for municipalities), Organisational Structure (executive agencies)
| You know… | Link with this report |
|---|---|
| FRBM Act, 2003 | Requires three fiscal statements with the budget; the report wants that medium-term view carried into spending limits |
| PFMS and Direct Benefit Transfer | Real-time tracking of scheme money, close to the SIAFI-style system the report asked for |
| NITI Aayog’s DMEO and output-outcome framework | Takes forward the outlay-output-outcome logic |
| First ARC (1966-70) | Its study team proposed performance budgeting, the first step towards results |
| Twelfth Finance Commission | Argued for accrual accounting in the medium term |
Quick check
UPSC-style (15 marks): “Public expenditure management is a challenge to the Government of India in the context of budget-making.” Discuss.
Links with past UPSC questions
Real UPSC questions this report helps you answer, in Prelims and Mains.
Prelims questions this report helps with:
- 2014: asked which items were covered under non-plan expenditure, such as defence, interest, salaries, pensions and subsidies. The report explains what non-plan meant and why it wanted the category scrapped.
- 2013: tested the Public Accounts Committee, including its size and its scrutiny of appropriation and finance accounts. The report gives the PAC’s strength as 22 members.
- 2012: asked about methods of parliamentary control over public finance, and the importance of the CAG. Both are covered in the chapter on external audit.
- 2011: asked who authorises withdrawals from the Consolidated Fund of India. The report explains the Appropriation Act route.
- 2010: tested what the FRBM Act did and did not stipulate. The report lists the three statements it requires with the budget.
Mains questions: the linked Mains PYQs listed after this article are real UPSC questions. Tap one to see it in full. How this report helps:
- Public expenditure management (2019) and capital vs revenue budget (2021): use the nine budget weaknesses, top-down budgeting and the plan/non-plan argument.
- CAG’s role (2016, 2018, 2024): use Articles 148–151, performance audit, the timeliness problem and the call for balanced audit.
- PAC (2017), Estimates Committee (2018), Standing Committees (2021): use the paras-examined gap and the proposal to finish all paras in a year.
- FRBM Act (2013) and restructuring of centrally sponsored schemes (2013): use the medium-term framework and the fund-flow chapter.
Honest limits
No UPSC question names this 2nd ARC report directly. The links above are conceptual. The 2019 GS III question on public expenditure management is the closest match; the CAG and committee questions use material the report covers in detail.
What should an aspirant remember?
The high-value points, grouped so you can revise them in one pass.
Institutions and dates:
- 2nd ARC Fourteenth Report, Strengthening Financial Management Systems, finalised April 2009; Moily resigned on 31 March 2009.
- Performance budgets 1969; zero-based budgeting from 1987-88; Outcome Budget 2005; Modified Cash Management System December 2006; Integrated Financial Adviser 1975, revised 2006.
Numbers worth carrying:
- 15% in March and 33% in the last quarter: spending caps under the Monthly Expenditure Plan.
- 308 of 901 central projects overran cost by 49.48% on average (June 2008).
- PAC: 22 members; discusses only 10 to 15 of 1,000 to 1,500 paras a year.
- Audits for a year to be finished by 30 September of the next year.
- 14,715 paras pending before State committees (March 2006).
Cause → effect links:
- Bids squeezed into a fixed total → unrealistic estimates → top-down ceilings.
- Funds lapse on 31 March → March rush → Monthly Expenditure Plan and carry-forward.
- Release booked as spending → parked funds and overstated accounts → sanction-based flow and a financial information system.
- Auditors reporting to those who pay → no independence → statutory Chief Internal Auditor.
- Too many paras, too little time → paras ignored → examine all paras within a year.
One-minute recap:
Read the chain below aloud. If you can explain each step, you understand the report.
Say this out loud
Financial reform is part of governance reform; this report focuses on spending
Budget honestly: realistic assumptions, top-down limits, no token provisions or ad hoc schemes
Think in years: medium-term limits, carry-forward, plan-budget-accounts alignment
Measure results: outlays to outputs to outcomes; end the plan/non-plan split
Follow the money: sanctions not cash, new Chart of Accounts, SIAFI-style system
Accrual accounting only after a task force, pilots and training
Audit better: Chief Internal Auditor, audit committees, CAG by 30 September, all paras in a year