Why this matters for UPSC
Panchayats and municipalities are the third tier of Indian democracy, but for decades they had the title of government without the money, staff or power to match. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission’s Sixth Report, Local Governance (October 2007), is the most complete official plan to fix that. It gave us the vocabulary UPSC still uses: Subsidiarity, Activity mapping, the District Council and the directly elected Mayor. It feeds GS II (local government, devolution), GS I (urbanisation), GS III (urban infrastructure), GS IV (accountability) and the Essay paper.
What is this report about?
First, the basics: who wrote this report, when, and what question it tries to answer.
Oct 2007
Report submitted
67
Recommendation heads in the summary
3 parts
Common, rural and urban issues
In 1992 Parliament passed the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments. They gave panchayats and municipalities a place in the Constitution, with regular elections, reserved seats and lists of subjects they could handle.
Fifteen years later, most of them were still weak. States had passed the laws but kept the real money, staff and decisions for themselves.
The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2nd ARC) was set up by the Union Government on 31 August 2005 to prepare a blueprint for revamping public administration. Its chairman was M. Veerappa Moily. Local self-government was one of its terms of reference.
Its Sixth Report, Local Governance: An Inspiring Journey into the Future, was signed in October 2007. It asks one question: how do we turn local bodies from paper institutions into real governments that citizens can see and hold to account?
In one sentence: give local governments the functions, funds and staff that match their constitutional status, and build the checks that keep that power honest.
The report has three parts. Part one covers issues common to villages and cities: the Constitution, elections, functions, money, planning and audit. Part two covers rural governance. Part three covers urban governance.
Quick check
Why did the 2nd ARC need to write about local governance fifteen years after the 73rd and 74th Amendments?
The big picture
Six principles hold the whole report together. Every later recommendation applies one of them.
The Commission opens its preface with Mahatma Gandhi’s image of an oceanic circle. Power should not be a pyramid pressing down on the village. It should be widening circles, with the individual at the centre and outer circles giving strength to the inner ones rather than crushing them.
From that idea the report draws six core principles:
- Subsidiarity. Do every job at the lowest level that can do it well. Pass upwards only what the lower level cannot manage.
- Democratic decentralisation. Elected local bodies, not officials, should decide local matters, and their authority must match their responsibility.
- Delineation of functions. Spell out clearly which tier does what, in every law, and keep reviewing it.
- Devolution in real terms. Hand over funds, functions and functionaries together. A function without money or staff is not devolution.
- Convergence. Citizens’ needs are not divided into departments, so services, and rural and urban planning, should come together at the local level.
- Citizen centricity. People should take part between elections too, through Gram Sabhas, Ward Committees and Area Sabhas.
Mental map: how the report is built
Diagnosis
Local bodies have constitutional status but little real power, money or staff
Principles
Subsidiarity, decentralisation, clear functions, real devolution, convergence, citizen centricity
Common reforms
Constitutional changes, District Council, framework law, finance commissions, planning, audit
Rural reforms
Activity mapping, own staff, end of parallel agencies, untied funds, PESA
Urban reforms
Directly elected Mayor, Ward Committees and Area Sabhas, municipal finance, metro authorities
Quick check
What does the report mean by “devolution in real terms”?
From Ripon to the 73rd Amendment
Local government in India is old. Its weakness after Independence has a history, and the report starts there.
India had village assemblies long before the British. The report points to the Chola village councils in the south, which collected revenue, settled disputes and managed irrigation and roads.
The modern structure began under the British, with municipal corporations in the presidency towns and, later, elected district boards. After Independence the Constitution placed village panchayats only in the Directive Principles (Article 40), so they were left to the States.
How local government evolved in India
1688
First municipal corporation set up at Madras
1882
Lord Ripon’s resolution expands elected local bodies
1919
Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms make local self-government a transferred subject
1950
Article 40 (Directive Principles) asks the State to organise village panchayats
1957
Balwantrai Mehta Committee proposes three-tier Panchayati Raj
1959
Rajasthan, followed by Andhra Pradesh, starts Panchayati Raj
1977–78
Asoka Mehta Committee: district as the first point of decentralisation; asks for constitutional status
1989
64th and 65th Amendment Bills pass the Lok Sabha but fail in the Rajya Sabha
1992
73rd (Panchayats, Part IX) and 74th (Municipalities, Part IXA) Amendments passed
2007
2nd ARC Sixth Report on Local Governance
Why did early Panchayati Raj fade? The report gives three reasons. Elections were postponed for years. Money for blocks dried up. And States created parastatals, such as water boards and slum boards, which took over work that belonged to local bodies.
By the 1970s, the report says, panchayats existed without adequate functions or authority.
Quick check
Why did the panchayats set up after the Balwantrai Mehta Committee weaken by the 1970s?
The problem: big structure, little power
What the report found wrong with local government in 2007, in numbers.
2,32,913
Village panchayats (Dec 2006)
28.3 lakh
Elected panchayat representatives
36.7%
Of them women
The structure was huge. Besides the village panchayats there were 6,094 intermediate panchayats and 537 district panchayats. No other democracy elects so many local representatives.
But the report describes panchayats as over-structured and under-empowered. They had constitutional status, yet States had transferred few real powers.
The money tells the story. In the preface, the chairman notes that local government revenue was about 15% of total government revenue in the USA in 2001 but only about 3% in India.
How much of their own spending local bodies could pay for (2002-03)
- Rural local bodies9.26%
- Urban local bodies68.97%
Other problems the report lists:
- Parallel bodies. Agencies such as the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) and water boards did local work outside the control of elected bodies.
- State control. States could suspend resolutions, supersede elected bodies and approve their budgets.
- No staff of their own. Panchayat employees mostly belonged to State departments and answered to them.
- Elite capture. Where local power is unequal, decentralisation can strengthen the hold of landlords and traders rather than the poor.
Unless authority at each level matches the responsibility, the report warns, we will keep presiding over a dysfunctional system of alibis.
Quick check
What does “over-structured but under-empowered” mean for panchayats?
Subsidiarity and activity mapping
The report’s central idea, and the practical tool for turning it into real work for local bodies.
Subsidiarity means the citizen is the starting point. Whatever a family or community can do, it should do. What it cannot do passes up to the panchayat, then to the State, then to the Union. Higher levels take only what needs scale, technology or wider coordination.
Today Article 243G says State legislatures may give panchayats powers in respect of the 29 subjects of the Eleventh Schedule. Article 243W does the same for municipalities and the 18 subjects of the Twelfth Schedule. Because the wording is “may”, many States did very little.
The report recommends amending Articles 243G and 243W so local bodies become institutions of self-government for all functions that can be performed locally, not just the listed ones.
What matters is not the subject but the functions under each subject.
Activity mapping is how this is done. A subject like education is too big to give to one tier, so it is broken into small activities and each is assigned to the tier best placed to do it.
How activity mapping works
Unbundle the subject
Example: basic education becomes teacher attendance, school repairs, buying equipment, hiring teachers
Sort each activity
Setting standards, planning, asset creation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
Assign to a tier
Test: economies of scale, spillover beyond the area, equity, local variety
Transfer funds and staff with it
Otherwise the transfer stays on paper
The report wants every State to set up a task force to map all Eleventh Schedule subjects within one year, and the Union to do the same for Centrally Sponsored Schemes.
It also wants a “local government memorandum” attached to every new Bill, saying whether the law involves local functions, on the model of the financial memorandum.
Quick check
Why can’t epidemic control be left entirely to a Gram Panchayat, under activity mapping?
A District Council for every district
The report’s answer to a long debate: what should run the district, the Collector or an elected body?
In 2007 a district had two parallel worlds. Villages had panchayats, towns had municipalities, and nothing joined them. The District Planning Committee under Article 243ZD was meant to plan for both, but the report found it too weak and a non-starter in many States.
There were two strong views on the Collector:
- The maximalist view. The Collector’s office is a colonial leftover and should be replaced by an elected district government.
- The minimalist view. The Collector has kept order for two centuries; panchayats cannot take on heavy regulatory work.
The Commission chose a middle path, which it calls the golden mean.
The District Council model
One elected District Council
Members from both rural and urban areas of the district
Runs all local functions
Powers under Articles 243G and 243W; the DPC becomes advisory or disappears
Collector as Chief Officer
Answers to the Council on local matters and to the State on regulatory ones
To make this possible, the report recommends substituting Article 243B(2) so that every district has a District Council representing all its rural and urban areas.
It also proposes other constitutional changes:
- Reservation stays. Article 243D (reservation for SCs, STs and women) should remain unchanged.
- No MPs or MLAs on local bodies. Legislators should not sit as members of panchayats or municipalities.
- A voice in the legislature. Parliament may provide for State Legislative Councils with members elected by local governments.
- Fairer seats. Lok Sabha and Assembly constituencies within a State should be readjusted after every census to match rapid urbanisation.
The District Council is a third tier of representative government that keeps, rather than abolishes, the strengths of the Collector’s office.
Quick check
How does the District Council model settle the Collector debate?
Money for local bodies
Functions without funds mean nothing. How the report wants local bodies to get money, and earn it.
Local bodies depend on the State because the big, growing taxes such as State excise, VAT and motor vehicle tax go to the State. Their own taxes, like property tax, are small and badly collected.
Two routes fix this: share more of the State’s money, and help local bodies raise their own.
Route 1: the State Finance Commission
Under Articles 243-I and 243Y, the Governor sets up a State Finance Commission (SFC) every five years to recommend how State taxes are shared with local bodies. The report found that many SFCs were late, poorly staffed and ignored. It recommends:
- Clear rules. Objective, transparent devolution norms, including backwardness indices, linked to the level of civic services citizens can expect.
- Action Taken Report. Placed in the State Legislature within six months of the SFC report.
- Qualified members. Each State should prescribe by law who can be appointed.
- Earlier constitution. Amend Article 243-I(1) so an SFC can be set up earlier than every fifth year.
- Rewards. Union transfers to States could reward States that devolve more to their local bodies.
Route 2: Own source revenue
- Property tax reform. Switch to the unit-area or capital-value method, put all tax details in the public domain, and map properties using GIS.
- More taxes for panchayats. Expand their tax domain by law and make levying them obligatory, with the State only setting a band of rates.
- Mineral wealth. Give panchayats a substantial share of mining royalty and allow them a cess on it.
- Borrowing. Let local bodies borrow from banks within limits; encourage municipal borrowing without State guarantees, with pooled financing for small towns.
- Land. Until Development Authorities merge with municipalities, give municipalities a share (say 25%) of their land-sale revenue.
People pay taxes willingly only when they can see the money turning into better services in their own locality.
The report also wants most transfers to panchayats to be Untied funds, money they can spend on their own priorities, and a separate panchayat sector line in the State budget.
Quick check
Name two ways the report suggests to raise local bodies’ own revenue.
Making panchayats real
The rural chapter: what must change so a panchayat can actually govern its village.
3 years
For panchayats to recruit their own staff
1 year
To finish activity mapping
2
Fund instalments a year: April and by September
The report’s rural agenda has five planks.
- More participation. In large Gram Panchayats, set up a Ward Sabha for each ward, taking on some powers of the Gram Sabha and the panchayat.
- Own staff. Panchayats should hire their own employees under State standards, after a zero-based review of staffing.
- Less State control. States should lose the power to suspend resolutions, approve panchayat budgets, or dissolve panchayats on their own. Complaints go to a local Ombudsman instead.
- No parallel bodies. Merge the DRDA and the District Water and Sanitation Committee into the Zila Parishad, as Kerala, Karnataka and West Bengal had done. Route all rural development money through panchayats.
- Regulatory work. Hand over tasks like rural policing, building bye-laws, and birth, death, caste and residence certificates.
The report also repeats the call from its Ethics in Governance report to abolish the MPLAD and MLALAD schemes, since they let legislators spend local development money outside the panchayats.
Parastatals should not be allowed to undermine the authority of the panchayats.
Panchayats in tribal areas
Part IX does not apply on its own to Fifth and Sixth Schedule areas. Parliament extended it to Fifth Schedule areas through PESA, the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, which gives the Gram Sabha special powers.
The report found PESA weakly implemented and recommends:
- Fix conflicting laws. Union and State laws that clash with PESA should be amended at once; the Union may issue directions to a reluctant State under the Fifth Schedule.
- Women in the Gram Sabha. A Gram Sabha meeting should count as quorate only if at least a third of those present are women.
- Tribal Sub-Plan. A professional planning unit in each State, and part of the TSP money made non-lapsable.
- Yearly check. An annual impact assessment of PESA States by a national institute.
Quick check
Why does the report want the DRDA merged into the Zila Parishad?
Running cities: an elected Mayor in charge
Why the report wants a city run by a Mayor the voters choose, and how citizens join in below the ward.
3 tiers
Council, Ward Committee, Area Sabha
10% or 15
Cap on the Mayor’s Cabinet, whichever is higher
5 lakh
Population per zonal office
In most Indian cities the Mayor is largely ceremonial. Real executive power lies with the Municipal Commissioner, an officer appointed by the State. Voters cannot hold the Commissioner to account at the next election.
The report points out that in 1924 Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was appointed chief executive of the Calcutta Corporation by its elected council. Independent India gave its city councils less power than that.
The Directly elected Mayor model fixes this:
- One head. The same person chairs the council and runs the city.
- Chosen by all voters. The Mayor is elected directly in a city-wide vote.
- Real executive power. The Mayor is the chief executive; the Commissioner performs functions the Mayor delegates.
- A Cabinet. In big cities the Mayor picks a Cabinet from among the elected corporators.
- Council as watchdog. The council approves the budget, oversees and makes rules.
Only when an elected executive holds real authority can people see the link between their vote and its consequences.
Below the council, the report wants two more layers so citizens take part between elections:
The three tiers of city government
Municipal Corporation or Council
Headed by the directly elected Mayor
Ward Committee (one per ward)
Street lights, sanitation, drainage, local roads, parks, local markets; gets funds en bloc and a share of the ward’s property tax
- Area Sabha · all voters of one or more polling-booth areas; ranks local works and picks beneficiaries, like a Gram Sabha
The Area Sabha is the urban cousin of the Gram Sabha. The report also wants cities to take on more functions beyond the Twelfth Schedule: school education, public health, traffic and civic policing, heritage, and land management including registration.
Quick check
What is wrong with the Mayor–Commissioner model in most Indian cities, according to the report?
Cities, services and the urban poor
How the report wants cities to deliver water, transport and housing, and to plan for the poor.
25–30
Cities to redevelop as world-class
10 lakh+
Cities that need a transport authority
4.03 crore
Slum dwellers, Census 2001
The report’s basic rule for services: once a State utility or parastatal enters a city’s boundary, it must answer to the city government.
- Water. Cities run distribution; metropolitan corporations handle the whole chain. Meter every connection and target subsidies at the poorest.
- Sanitation. A separate user charge for sewerage, a time-bound plan for sewers in slums, and segregation of waste at source.
- Manual scavenging. Survey within six months and eradicate within a year, with funds tied to it.
- Transport. A Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority (UMTA) in every city of over 10 lakh people, with priority to public transport and pedestrians.
- Real estate. An urgent law to regulate the real estate sector.
Extra bodies the report wants as cities grow
Over 10 lakh people
Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority; Metropolitan Police Authority (from the Public Order report)
Over 50 lakh people
Metropolitan Planning Committee chaired by the Chief Minister; Metropolitan Environment Authority
The report links city growth to the JNNURM (Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission), launched in 2005. It wants about 25 to 30 cities of over ten lakh people redeveloped to world standards, with reform conditions enforced strictly and a zero-tolerance approach to civic violations.
For the urban poor:
- Count them. A door-to-door survey within a year, with an Area Sabha member on each team, and multi-utility ID cards.
- House them. Total redevelopment of slums, a fixed share of land in every project reserved for the poor, and night shelters.
- Plan ahead. City Development Plans fixed for ten years, with disaster safety built into zoning rules.
- No islands. SEZs and gated townships must stay under the civic laws of the local body.
No island can exist outside the jurisdiction of constitutionally elected governments, not even an SEZ.
Quick check
Which city body does the report want in every city of over ten lakh people, and why?
Keeping local bodies accountable
More power invites more misuse. How the report wants to keep local bodies honest without letting the State bully them.
The report admits that decentralising power can, at first, decentralise corruption. But its answer is not the old system, where State officials could dismiss elected bodies at will. It replaces that control with independent checks.
How a complaint against a local body would be handled
Complaint or State concern
Corruption, maladministration, or grounds for dissolving a body
Local body Ombudsman investigates
One for a group of districts; a separate one for each metropolitan corporation
Report to the Lokayukta
The Lokayukta forwards it with recommendations
Governor decides
If the advice is not followed, reasons must be made public
The Local body Ombudsman is a single person of proven integrity, not a serving official, chosen by the Chief Minister, the Speaker and the Leader of the Opposition. Election-related complaints go to the State Election Commission instead.
The same collegium would choose the State Election Commissioner. The report also wants the State Election Commission, not the State Government, to handle delimitation and reservation of local constituencies.
Other checks:
- Audit. A National Municipal Accounts Manual for cities, CAG technical guidance written into State law, and an independent local fund auditor.
- Legislature oversight. A Standing Committee of the State Legislature on local bodies, working like the Public Accounts Committee.
- Money rules. A fiscal responsibility law for local bodies.
- Citizens’ voice. Social audit, citizens’ report cards, wider suo motu disclosure under the RTI Act, and in-house grievance redress.
Decentralised power should lead to greater efficacy and accountability, not merely decentralised corruption and harassment.
Quick check
Under the report’s scheme, can a State dissolve a municipality on its own?
Difficult terms in simple words
The terms this report uses again and again, each with a plain meaning and an example.
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Third tier | Local government below the Union and the States. Example: Your Gram Panchayat or municipal corporation |
| Subsidiarity | Do each task at the lowest level that can do it well. Example: Fixing a village handpump is the panchayat’s job, not the State’s |
| Devolution | Real transfer of power, money and staff to an elected body. Example: A panchayat hiring and paying its own health worker |
| Activity mapping | Breaking a subject into small tasks and assigning each to a tier. Example: School repairs to the village, teacher hiring to the district |
| Parastatal | A government agency outside the regular departments that does public work. Example: A State water supply board |
| Eleventh Schedule | The 29 subjects States may give to panchayats. Example: Drinking water, minor irrigation, primary schools |
| Twelfth Schedule | The 18 subjects States may give to municipalities. Example: Urban planning, water supply, slum improvement |
| Gram Sabha | All voters of a village panchayat area meeting together. Example: Approving the village’s list of beneficiaries |
| Area Sabha | The urban version of a Gram Sabha, covering one or more polling-booth areas. Example: Residents of a few city blocks choosing local works |
| State Finance Commission | A body set up every five years to share State money with local bodies. Example: Recommends what share of State taxes goes to municipalities |
| District Planning Committee | Body under Article 243ZD that combines rural and urban plans for a district. Example: Merging panchayat and municipal plans into one district plan |
| Untied funds | Money a local body can spend on its own priorities. Example: A panchayat choosing to fix drains instead of building a hall |
| Own source revenue | Money a local body raises itself. Example: Property tax, water charges, market fees |
| Elite capture | When powerful local groups take over local institutions. Example: A landlord family controlling a panchayat’s decisions |
| Ombudsman | An independent official who investigates complaints against public bodies. Example: Probing misuse of funds by a sarpanch |
How it actually works
Follow one village problem through today’s system and through the report’s system, then a few analogies.
Take a village whose school building is falling apart. Under the old system, as the report describes it, the panchayat has to petition a State department, the repair waits for a State budget, and the engineer answers to the State, not the village.
The same problem under the report’s model
Activity mapping
School repairs are assigned to the village panchayat
Money arrives
Untied funds come in two instalments, in April and by September
Gram Sabha decides
Villagers rank the repair as a priority
Panchayat acts
Its own staff, or an outsourced contractor, does the work
Checks
Social audit, accounts audit, Ombudsman if there is a complaint
The test of decentralisation is simple: can the people who notice the problem also decide, pay and answer for the fix?
What the numbers mean:
- 9.26% means dependence. Rural bodies could pay for less than a tenth of their own running costs. Whoever pays the bills controls the agenda, so this was the State.
- 36.7% women means a real change. Even before many States raised reservation to 50%, over a third of panchayat members were women.
- Ten lakh people is the city threshold. Most metro-level bodies in the report start at this size.
Analogies (these are comparisons, not legal descriptions):
| Idea | Analogy → fact |
|---|---|
| Subsidiarity | Analogy: a family handles its own chores and calls the plumber only for what it cannot fix. Fact: Functions go up only when the lower tier cannot do them |
| Funds, functions, functionaries | Analogy: a cricket captain needs a bat, a team and the field, not just the title. Fact: Devolution counts only when all three are transferred |
| Parastatals | Analogy: a second kitchen in the house that the family cannot enter. Fact: Water boards and DRDAs did local work outside elected control |
| Directly elected Mayor | Analogy: a school captain who also runs the events, instead of a teacher doing it. Fact: The elected Mayor becomes chief executive |
| Ombudsman before dissolution | Analogy: a referee reviewing footage before a red card. Fact: No supersession without an Ombudsman’s recommendation |
Indian examples in the report:
- Kerala is the notable exception where funds, functions and staff were really transferred.
- Kerala, Karnataka and West Bengal had already merged DRDAs into district panchayats.
- Andhra Pradesh (1996): an industrial estate run by local entrepreneurs gave 30% of the charges it raised to the municipality, a model the report suggests for SEZs.
Quick check
Why does a panchayat that pays for less than a tenth of its own costs struggle to act independently?
Why does this matter?
Who gains, who resists, and the trade-offs that make local government reform hard.
Local bodies deliver what people touch every day: drinking water, drains, street lights, primary schools and certificates. When they fail, the citizen sees the failure first.
Giving up power is never easy, the report admits, and States naturally hold on to their turf.
| Who | How it affects them |
|---|---|
| Citizens | Services decided closer to home, and new ways to take part (Gram Sabha, Ward Committee, Area Sabha) |
| Panchayats and municipalities | More money, staff and power, but more audit and Ombudsman scrutiny |
| State governments | Lose day-to-day control and the power to supersede local bodies; gain a coordinating role |
| District Collectors | Stay, but answer to an elected District Council on local matters |
| MPs and MLAs | Lose MPLADS/MLALADS and seats on local bodies |
| Women, SCs and STs | Reservation retained; women’s quorum rule in PESA Gram Sabhas |
This grouping is our reading of how the recommendations would play out, not a table from the report.
The big trade-offs:
- Autonomy vs accountability. More power to local bodies risks local corruption; more checks risk smothering them.
- Democracy vs capacity. Elected bodies are legitimate, but many lack trained staff for complex tasks.
- Equity vs elite capture. Decentralisation can empower the poor, or hand power to the village elite.
- State role vs local role. States must step back without leaving local bodies alone and unsupported.
Quick check
Give one trade-off the report had to manage, and how it handled it.
What the report actually says
Separate the facts it records, the advice it gives, and what has happened since.
Facts, recommendations and later developments are different things. Good answers keep them apart.
Facts it records:
- 2,32,913 village, 6,094 intermediate and 537 district panchayats as on 1 December 2006, with 36.7% women among elected members.
- Own resources covered 9.26% of rural and 68.97% of urban local bodies’ revenue spending in 2002-03.
- Most Mayors are ceremonial; executive power lies with the State-appointed Commissioner.
Main recommendations:
- Amend Articles 243G and 243W (subsidiarity) and 243B(2) (District Council).
- A Framework Law for local governments under Article 252, on the lines of South Africa’s law, which consenting States can adopt.
- Activity mapping within a year; panchayats to hire their own staff within three years.
- A local body Ombudsman; no supersession without its recommendation.
- Directly elected executive Mayors, Ward Committees and Area Sabhas.
- Abolish MPLADS and MLALADS.
The Commission’s interpretations:
- Decentralisation is not the same as local democracy; with sharp inequality it can concentrate power.
- Rural and urban governance should converge, not stay in separate silos.
What happened later (selected, as of October 2026):
| Status | Recommendation |
|---|---|
| Partly acted on | Merge DRDAs into Zila Parishads: the Union discontinued its DRDA Administration scheme from 1 April 2022 and asked States to merge DRDAs with Zila Parishads |
| Partly acted on | Regulate real estate: the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act was passed in 2016 |
| Overtaken | JNNURM ended; urban funding moved to AMRUT and the Smart Cities Mission (2015) |
| Not done | MPLADS has not been abolished |
| Not done | Articles 243G, 243W and 243B have not been amended as proposed; no District Council has been created under the Constitution |
| Uneven | Only some States elect Mayors directly, and few give them full executive power |
Status as of October 2026
The report is a recommendation, not law. No single public list shows which of its local governance recommendations the Union accepted, so in answers present them as the 2nd ARC’s proposals and cite later steps (DRDA merger, RERA, AMRUT) as partial movement in the same direction.
Quick check
Name one recommendation that has since been partly acted on and one that has not.
UPSC relevance
Where this report fits in each paper, and why the examiner cares.
| Paper | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Prelims | Polity: Parts IX and IXA, Schedules 11 and 12, SFCs, PESA, history of Panchayati Raj. UPSC asks about these provisions often (see below) |
| GS I | Urbanisation, its problems and remedies. Slums, the urban poor, mega cities and peri-urban growth |
| GS II | Devolution of powers and finances to local levels and challenges therein; statutory and constitutional bodies. The core of the report |
| GS III | Infrastructure; disaster management. Urban transport authorities, water and sewerage, disaster-safe zoning |
| GS IV | Accountability and probity. Ombudsman, social audit, citizens’ report cards, transparency of tax rolls |
| Essay | Grassroots democracy, Gandhi’s Gram Swaraj, cities of the future. The oceanic circle is a ready opening |
Quick check
UPSC-style (15 marks): “Local self-government in India has a constitutional body but not a working soul.” Examine with reference to the 2nd ARC’s Sixth Report.
Connecting to what you already know
This report ties together topics you have already met in polity and governance.
Where this report sits in your syllabus
Article 40 (DPSP)
The original, non-binding promise of village panchayats
Balwantrai Mehta (1957) and Asoka Mehta (1977–78)
Three-tier model and the district as the key unit
73rd and 74th Amendments (1992)
Parts IX and IXA, Articles 243 to 243ZG, SFCs, SECs, DPCs, MPCs
PESA (1996)
Gram Sabha powers in Fifth Schedule areas
2nd ARC Sixth Report (2007)
How to make all of it work in practice
| You know… | Link with this report |
|---|---|
| Finance Commission (Article 280) | Article 280 asks the FC to suggest measures to supplement local body resources based on SFC reports; the report wants FC grants tied to audit reforms |
| 13th Finance Commission | The report asks the government to put local tax-base reform in its terms of reference |
| 2nd ARC Ethics report | Source of the call to abolish MPLADS, repeated here |
| 2nd ARC Public Order report | Source of the Metropolitan Police Authority idea |
| Smart Cities and AMRUT (2015) | Successors to JNNURM, which the report wanted to use for 25–30 world-class cities |
| RERA (2016) | Matches the report’s call for a real estate regulation law |
Quick check
Which two Articles does the report want amended to apply subsidiarity, and what do they currently do?
Links with past UPSC questions
Real UPSC questions this report helps you answer, in Prelims and Mains.
Prelims questions this report helps with:
- 2025: three statements on intermediate panchayats, member age and who sets up the finance commission for panchayats. All three were wrong. The Governor, not the Chief Minister, constitutes the State Finance Commission.
- 2017: local self-government is best explained as an exercise in democratic decentralisation, one of the report’s six core principles.
- 2015: the fundamental objects of Panchayati Raj. The report’s principles (participation, decentralisation, accountability) are the logic behind the answer.
- 2012: how DRDAs help reduce rural poverty. The report recommends merging DRDAs into Zila Parishads.
- 2011: what the 73rd Amendment provides. It provides State Election Commissions and State Finance Commissions; District Planning Committees come from the 74th Amendment (Article 243ZD).
- 2010: which body recommends to the Governor the taxes panchayats may levy. The answer is the State Finance Commission.
- 2009: where India’s first municipal corporation was set up. The report dates it to Madras in 1688.
Mains questions: the linked Mains PYQs listed after this article are real UPSC questions. How this report helps:
- States reluctant to empower ULBs (2023) and the effectiveness of local self-government (2017, 2015): use the over-structured but under-empowered diagnosis, parastatals, State supersession and the Mayor–Commissioner problem.
- Merging rural and urban local bodies (2024): use the convergence principle and the District Council.
- Decentralisation and the grassroots (2022): use the funds, functions and functionaries test and activity mapping.
- Panchayat finance (2018) and the 13th FC on local finance (2013): use own-revenue reform, mining royalty, borrowing and SFC reform.
- Women’s reservation in local bodies (2019): the report keeps Article 243D and adds a women’s quorum rule in PESA areas.
- Fifth Schedule and Left Wing Extremism (2013) and the urban poor in metros (2023): use the PESA and urban poverty recommendations.
Honest limits
No UPSC question so far names this report directly. The links are conceptual: the report is the most complete official source for the diagnosis and remedies these questions ask about. The 2019 and 2023 GS I links are weaker than the GS II ones.
What should an aspirant remember?
The high-value points, grouped so you can revise them in one pass.
Institutions and dates:
- 2nd ARC set up 31 August 2005, chaired by M. Veerappa Moily; Sixth Report, Local Governance, October 2007.
- Balwantrai Mehta 1957 · Rajasthan 1959 · Asoka Mehta 1977–78 · 73rd and 74th Amendments 1992 · PESA 1996.
Recommendations worth carrying:
- Six principles: subsidiarity, democratic decentralisation, delineation of functions, devolution in real terms, convergence, citizen centricity.
- Amend Articles 243G and 243W; substitute 243B(2) for a District Council; Collector as its Chief Officer.
- Framework Law under Article 252 on the South African model.
- Activity mapping in one year; own panchayat staff in three years; merge DRDA into the Zila Parishad.
- Directly elected executive Mayor; Ward Committee and Area Sabha; zonal offices per five lakh people.
- Local body Ombudsman; no supersession without its recommendation; abolish MPLADS and MLALADS.
- UMTA for cities over ten lakh; MPC chaired by the CM for cities over fifty lakh.
Cause → effect links:
- Permissive Articles (“may”) → States keep power → local bodies stay weak.
- Parastatals doing local work → elected bodies sidelined → merge them into local bodies.
- Little own revenue → dependence on the State → property tax and tax-domain reform.
- Ceremonial Mayor → no accountable city executive → direct election with executive power.
One-minute recap
Read the chain below aloud. If you can explain each step, you understand the report.
Say this out loud
The 73rd and 74th Amendments built the structure; States held back the power
Six principles, led by subsidiarity: do each job at the lowest capable level
Activity mapping and amended Articles 243G and 243W make that concrete
A District Council joins rural and urban areas; the Collector stays as Chief Officer
Money: stronger SFCs, untied funds, real own revenue
Villages: own staff, no parallel DRDAs, stronger PESA
Cities: elected executive Mayor, Ward Committees, Area Sabhas
Checks: Ombudsman, audit and citizens instead of State control